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ABSTRACT
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is an emerging network paradigm that de-
couples the control plane from the data plane, which allows network administrators
to consolidate common network services into a centralized module named SDN con-
troller. Applications’ policies are transformed into standardized network rules in the
data plane via SDN controller. Even though this centralization brings a great flexibil-
ity and programmability to the network, network rules generated by SDN applications
cannot be trusted because there may exist malicious SDN applications, and insecure
network flows can be made due to complex relations across network rules. In this dis-
sertation, I investigate how to identify and resolve these security violations in SDN
caused by the combination of network rules and applications’ policies. To this end, I
propose a systematic policy management framework that better protects SDN itself
and hardens existing network defense mechanisms using SDN.
More specifically, I discuss the following four security challenges in this disser-
tation: (1) In SDN, generating reliable network rules is challenging because SDN
applications cannot be trusted and have complicated dependencies each other. To
address this problem, I analyze applications’ policies and remove those dependen-
cies by applying grid-based policy decomposition mechanism; (2) One network rule
could accidentally affect others (or by malicious users), which lead to creating of
indirect security violations. I build systematic and automated tools that analyze net-
work rules in the data plane to detect a wide range of security violations and resolve
them in an automated fashion; (3) A fundamental limitation of current SDN pro-
tocol (OpenFlow) is a lack of statefulness, which is extremely important to several
security applications such as stateful firewall. To bring statelessness to SDN-based
environment, I come up with an innovative stateful monitoring scheme by extending
existing OpenFlow specifications; (4) Existing honeynet architecture is suffering from
i
its limited functionalities of ’data control’ and ’data capture’. To address this chal-
lenge, I design and implement an innovative next generation SDN-based honeynet
architecture.
ii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
A major shift in network infrastructure is in progress from the hardware-based os-
sified network to the software-based programmable network. The compelling example
of this is the advent of software-defined networks (SDNs) [47, 46, 60]. Traditional net-
work relies on a variety of hardware devices that can be installed at a specific location
in a network to provide networking functions such as firewall, IDS/IPS, load-balancer,
and proxy. However, the mixture of control logic and its data processing modules in-
side the box makes the network more complex and hard to manage. To solve this
challenge, SDN decouples the control plane from the data plane and consolidates the
control logic of devices into a dedicated SDN controller. In this way, SDN helps net-
work administrators easily program underlying network via specific control channels
(e.g., OpenFlow [86]).
Several benefits that SDN brings are summarized as below:
• Centralized network environment: Compared to the traditional network envi-
ronment, SDN basically decouples the control plane of a hardware from its data
processing modules [86]. The separation of the control plane from the data
plane allows network administrators to consolidate common network services
into SDN controller and help them centrally program the entire network.
• High-speed networking: SDNs implement high speed traffic forwarding by ap-
plying simple ”match-action” rules in the data plane. According to a recent
1
report from Google [70], SDN helped them achieve the utilization of WAN at
close to 100% utilization whereas other state-of-the-art network techniques only
showed about 30% to 40% network utilization. In addition, recent researches
have shown that SDN controllers can handle 1.6 million requests per second with
the response time of 2ms on average [118] and SDN switches has achieved high
throughput: 10.1 million packets (64B) per second with 100K flow rules [92].
• Flexible and programmable functions: To lower the barrier to network innova-
tion, SDN allows network administrators to easily program the data plane via
specific control channels such as OpenFlow [31]. An OpenFlow switch supports
multiple flow tables to process incoming packets and enforce multiple actions
using set-field actions. In this way, SDN transforms the switch into multi func-
tional device that acts as a route, firewall, and/or NAT device. Such flexibility
and programmability can significantly help network administrators design and
manage networks.
• Synergy with virtualization techniques: SDN is even more powerful when it
comes with virtualization techniques such as network functions virtualization
(NFV [61, 125]). A majority of cloud platforms including OpenStack [24],
Xen [29] and CloudStack [7] supports a software switch (Open vSwitch [25])
to enable the connectivity between each tenant. SDN can be considered to
effectively manage and program the tenant network by dynamically steering
network traffics. Recent studies [53, 100] also show that combining SDN with
NFV is promising and synergistic.
However, these benefits enabled by SDN come at a cost of security. I introduce four
important security challenges in emerging SDN-based network environment. First,
generating reliable policies in SDN is challenging. More specifically, some network
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rules generated by an arbitrary SDN application cannot be trusted. There may
exist SDN applications (e.g., firewall, load-balancer, route applications) that jointly
manage the same network flow. These applications maintain their own policies and
necessary network rules will be composed by the SDN controller to implement these
policies. However, complex relations among applications’ policies may create the
insecure and inefficient generation of network rules. For example, suppose that the
controller composes two SDN applications (load-balancer and firewall) sequentially.
In this case, rewritten packets by the load-balancer could enable malicious packets to
bypass the firewall since the firewall would not be able to see original packet headers.
Hence, the careless composition of application policies may cause security breaches in
the network. In case network administrators want to compose two SDN applications
in parallel to enforce their policies simultaneously. Indeed, some policies in the load-
balancer are unnecessary to be composed if the firewall blocks the same network
traffic. Therefore, it becomes inefficient to always compose the multiple policies.
Second, network rules in the data plane (i.e., switches) create complex relations,
which lead to indirect security violations. OpenFlow, as the prevailing SDN standard,
allows various set-field actions that can dynamically change the packet headers
in a path. Adversaries could take advantage of this feature to strategically enable
flow rules that would evade network security mechanisms. For example, the firewall
application has a policy to deny network packets from host A to host C, namely flow 1.
Suppose that another application running on the controller establishes a flow 2 for
the connection between host A and host D by installing a set of network rules, which
do not violate the firewall policy. Adversaries then install a new network rule that
rewrites the source address (SRC) of the packets to host B and the destination address
(DST) of the packets to host C. In this case, if host A sends a packet to host D, the
packet will be first processed by the malicious network rule and eventually delivered
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to host C, which violates the firewall policy. This type of network attacks is newly
introduced in SDN-based network.
Third, a fundamental limitation of OpenFlow is the lack of statefulness. Current
OpenFlow mechanism allows SDN controller to generate network policies based on
the first packet (e.g., TCP SYN) of a new flow. Because the controller is unaware
of subsequent packets of the flow, including state changing packets (e.g., TCP FIN),
the controller has no knowledge of the state of connections in the network. This
per-flow based OpenFlow workflow is insufficient for enabling state-based network
applications (e.g., stateful firewalls) and monitoring suspicious behaviors occurring
inside of a flow (e.g., man-in-the-middle attacks). For example, a firewall could specify
“packets from server B to host A are allowed, if and only if host A initiates the
connection to server B.” This stateful policy is incredibly useful for network firewalls
when they specify that a web server should accept incoming connections but never
initiate an outgoing connection. However, it is impossibly hard to build a stateful
firewall in an SDN-based network without the support of stateful packet inspection.
In addition, adversaries can attempt unauthorized access to an active connection by
performing man-in-the-middle attacks including TCP sequence inference attacks by
spoofing packets. If adversaries successively infers the sequence number of the next
packet, they could terminate active connections by setting the TCP flags with FIN.
With current OpenFlow mechanism, it is challenging to detect this type of attacks
occurring in between end hosts.
Lastly, the applicable domains of SDN up to date are heavily restricted to data
center networks, and campus networks. This makes following question arise: “Can
SDN help improve security of other networks?” More specifically, I am interested in
adopting SDN into traditional honeynet architecture. The latest honeynet architec-
ture (Gen-III [115, 33]) basically employs a custom firewall called honeywall as the
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gateway of the network to take control of inbound/outbound traffic. However, current
honeynet architecture is suffering from its limited functionalities of ’data control’ and
’data capture’. Existing data control mechanism cannot monitor internal propagation
of malware in the network, and it does not support honeypot transitions from one
to another (e.g., a low-interaction honeypot to a high-interaction honeypot). The
data capture capability of traditional honeynet is also restricted as it is vulnerable to
fingerprinting attacks.
1.2 Dissertation Statement
To overcome aforementioned challenges, I envision that analyzing network policies
and enforcing them in an appropriate manner are imperative in both protecting SDN-
based network itself and hardening existing network defense mechanisms. I thus
develop following hypothesis for this dissertation:
“Systematic policy management is imperative in software-defined networks (SDNs),
and it can help improve security of SDN-based network environment and existing se-
curity measures.”
To validate the hypothesis above, I propose a systematic policy management
framework for SDN that solves the security challenges and enables policy-driven net-
work defense schemes. To address the first challenge, generating reliable network
rules in SDN, I propose the grid-based policy decomposition mechanism called RPM
that breaks dependency relations across different SDN applications. This mechanism
globally examines all application-specific policies to identify overlapping policies and
generate disjointed matching space to generate reliable network rules. For the second
challenge, which is indirect security violations, I propose FlowGuard that catego-
rizes each of violation cases into partial and entire violation and provides automatic
5
and effective resolution mechanisms. Based on the class of violations, it performs four
different resolution strategies: dependency breaking, update rejecting, flow removing,
and packet blocking. To address the lack of statefulness in SDN, I design an inno-
vative per-connection monitoring scheme named StateMon by making lightweight
extension of current OpenFlow specification (OpenConnection). OpenConnection-
enabled switch maintains customized flow table to enforce connection-based actions
at the data plane and sends them to the controller to inform state-changing events
while the controller centrally maintains the states of each connection in the net-
work. To address the last challenge, I introduce HoneyProxy as a next generation
SDN-based honeynet. HoneyProxy globally monitors all internal traffic via SDN
controller to prevent internal malware propagation, and it enables a novel connection
management mechanism across different honeypots to support honeypot transitions.
HoneyProxy also improves the data capture capability in existing honeynet by cir-
cumventing fingerprinting attacks through multicasting malicious traffic to relevant
honeypots and selecting the response which does not contain fingerprinting indica-
tor(s) from them.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 first describes
generic OpenFlow workflow with essential backgrounds of this dissertation. Next, I
elaborate security challenges in generating network rules for SDN in Chapter 3. Chap-
ter 4 discusses detection methodologies and resolution strategies to address indirect
security violations, which is based on an analysis of stateless network rules. In Chap-
ter 5, I present stateful network monitoring schemes for SDN. SDN-based intelligent
honeynet will be presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Software-Defined Network (SDN) and OpenFlow
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, each network box in the conventional network has
specialized packet forwarding hardware to process incoming and outgoing packets.
Network operating system and applications run on this hardware to control and man-
age it in an appropriate fashion. However, such an architecture implements rather
“closed” network environment since all components are bundled in a single box. Con-
sequently, it not only becomes extremely difficult for network programmers to change
the configurations but also requires high maintenance costs once these boxes are de-
ployed in the network. In addition, it might not be fully compatible with each other
due to different versions of software and/or different vendors.
On the other hand, SDN is trying to break those tight relation between hardware
and software by decoupling the data plane from the control plane. SDN takes network
operating systems out of the box and consolidates them into the centralized control
plane. In this way, network applications can also be consolidated so as to run on
top of SDN control plane together. The control plane exposes northbound APIs
to the application plane to communicate each other. In the data plane, instead
of having specialized forwarding hardware, SDN only needs simplified forwarding
hardware because southbound APIs are standardized under the SDN protocols such as
OpenFlow [23]. Through OpenFlow, SDN enables “open” and programmable network
infrastructure and lets network programmers implement business logic and enforce
them in a centralized manner.
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(a) Conventional network architecture
(b) SDN architecture
Figure 2.1: Architectural Difference Between Conventional Network and SDN.
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As the first and widely adopted standard for SDN, OpenFlow [114] essentially
implements SDN concepts, and makes the entire network to become directly pro-
grammable as well as the underlying infrastructure to be abstracted for network
applications. With OpenFlow, only the data plane exists in the network device, and
all control decisions are communicated to the device through a logically-centralized
controller. To understand how OpenFlow implements SDN concepts, we provide an
overview of the current OpenFlow workflow. When an OpenFlow-enabled switch re-
ceives a packet, it first checks its flow tables to find matching rules. If no such rules
exist, this means it is the first packet of a new flow. The switch then forwards the
packet to the controller, and it is the controller’s job to decide how to handle the
flow and to install flow table rules in the appropriate switches 1 . Specifically, the
switch encapsulates the raw packet within an OFPT PACKET IN message to send it to
the controller, then the controller installs corresponding rules called flow entries into
the switches along the controller’s intended path for the flow. Once these flow entries
are installed, all subsequent packets of this flow are directly forwarded by the switches
without sending the packet to the controller.
For example, in Figure 2.2, host A wants to initiate a TCP connection with web
server B. The first packet (TCP SYN) sent by host A is checked by the ingress
switch S1 and forwarded to the controller because S1 has no matching flow entry for
the packet. The controller allows the flow from host A to server B by installing flow
entries fe1, fe2, and fe3, into switches S1, S2, and S3, respectively. The flow from
host A to server B is called as a forward flow. Using the same process, the response
packet (TCP SYNACK) generated by server B will trigger the controller to install
fe4, fe5, and fe6 into S3, S2, and S1, respectively. The flow from server B to host A
1The controller has a global view of the network, so it can calculate the best routing path that
the new flow should take in the network.
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fe1: A → B forward fe3: A → B forward
Forward Flow Reverse Flow
S1 S3
SDN Controller
Host A
Webserver B
fe6: B → A forward fe4: B → A forward
S2
fe2: A → B forward
fe5: B → A forward
SDN Applications
Route
App
Load-balance
App
Firewall
App
Webserver C
A → B
B → A
Figure 2.2: Example of a Standard OpenFlow Connection.
is called as a reverse flow. Upon the completion of these bi-directional flows, host A
can establish a TCP connection with web server B.
2.2 Security Challenges in SDN
There exist several unique security challenges in SDN, which stem from its ar-
chitectural differences from the conventional network [105, 39, 78, 79, 93, 34]. First,
current southbound APIs (e.g., OpenFlow [31]) allow various set-field actions that
can dynamically change the packet headers. Adversaries could take advantage of this
feature to strategically enable flow rules that would evade network security mecha-
nisms (e.g., firewalls) [95]. In addition, flow rules may overlap each other in a flow
table, indicating the intra-table dependency of flow rules [74]. The rules in a fire-
wall policy may also overlap each other [122]. These rule dependencies could also be
leveraged by malicious SDN applications to bypass existing security measures such
as firewalls.
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Second, unprecedented threats are emerging in the control layer due to the nature
of SDN, which is centralization. In particular, attackers residing in the data plane
may target specific SDN controller by launching DoS attacks or poisoning the network
visibility. DoS attacks [110, 53] targeting the controller can be a significant threat
since it may result in disrupting all network services running on the same controller.
Other attacks such as topology poisoning [65] that tricks a real topology by manip-
ulating LLDP packets would also be possible. In the worst case scenario, attackers
would be able to exploit the entire communication channel and hijack sessions be-
tween SDN switches and the controller (man-in-the-middle introduced in [105, 39]).
Upon successful exploitation, adversaries could take full control of the data plane in
the network by manipulating OpenFlow messages destined to SDN switches.
Third, the application plane in SDN is not only suffering from design flaws but also
vulnerable to information disclosure and rootkits. There exist no standard require-
ment nor rules in implementing the controller or SDN applications, thus design flaws
or vulnerabilities may arise depending on their implementation. For example, Rose-
mary [111] exploits design flaws of existing controller that allows SDN applications
to run in the same privilege zone with the controller. By calling system exit function
from SDN applications, attackers can eventually crash network services running on
the controller. In addition, user-defined or application-specific implementation makes
finding malicious applications to become extremely difficult. Malicious users may ex-
ploit these inherent limitations to develop and distribute malicious SDN applications
to SDN markets such as SDN Dev Center [19]. Consequently, malicious applications
could leak network information [105] and install rootkits into the controller [103].
This is why SDN applications cannot be fully trusted and need to be validated.
In this dissertation, we are not trying to solve all types of security challenges in
SDN. But we believe many security challenges can be addresses via well-managed
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network policies. In particular, we are targeting: (1) malicious SDN applications,
which will be discussed in Chapter 3; (2) flow modification attacks, which is possibly
mitigated using stateless policy management (Chapter 4); and (3) man-in-the-middle
attacks, which can be mitigated by stateful policy management (Chapter 5).
2.3 Policy Management and Policy Verification Tools for SDN
A couple of verification tools [35, 74, 73, 76, 85] for checking network invariants
and policy correctness in OpenFlow networks have been proposed. Anteater [85]
detects violations of network invariants using a SAT solver through transferring the
data-plane information to boolean expressions and converting network invariants into
instances of SAT problem. FlowChecker [35] translates network policies into boolean
expressions and uses Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) to model the network state for
checking network invariants. However, both Anteater and FlowChecker are static in
nature and could not scale well to dynamic changes in the network. VeriFlow [76]
and NetPlumber [74] are capable of checking the compliance of network updates
with specified invariants in real time. VeriFlow uses graph search techniques to verify
network-wide invariants and deals with dynamic changes. NetPlumber utilizes Header
Space Analysis (HSA) [73] in an incremental manner to ensure real-time response for
checking network policies through building a dependency graph. Even though these
tools can be potentially used to detect network policy violations, they could not pro-
vide automatic and effective violation resolution. Also, they ignore rule dependencies
within security constraints, such as firewall policies, for compliance checking.
Policy verification tools discussed above are able to check network reachability
and potentially utilized for tracking flow paths in OpenFlow networks. However,
Anteater [85] and FlowChecker [35] are indeed offline systems and cannot be applied
for real-time flow tracking. VeriFlow [76] can perform reachability checking in real
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time, but it does not support dynamic packet modifications. Another option for flow
tracking would be FlowTags [54], which can additionally deal with dynamic trans-
formations in the presence of legacy middleboxes (e.g., proxies). However, FlowTags
needs to alter existing OpenFlow architecture. In this dissertation, we leverage the
mechanism introduced by NetPlumber [74] to track flow paths for network policy
violation detection, since NetPlumber provides a couple of features that fit for our
purpose, such as support for arbitrary header modifications, automatic rule depen-
dency detection, and real-time response.
As another work, FortNOX [95] was proposed as a software extension aiming
to provide security constraint enforcement for OpenFlow controllers, being able to
identify indirect security violations. FortNOX was then used as a security enforcement
kernel for FRESCO [109], an OpenFlow security application development framework.
However, we cannot directly adopt FortNOX approach due to several reasons. On one
hand, the rule conflict analysis algorithm provided by FortNOX records rule relations
in alias sets, which are unable to accurately track all flows. In particular, the conflict
detection algorithm in FortNOX only conducts pairwise conflict analysis between new
flow rule(s) and each single security constraint without considering rule dependencies
within flow tables [74, 76] and among security constraints (represented as a firewall
policy in our approach) [63, 122]. On the other hand, when FortNOX detects a
security violation caused by new rule(s) installed by a non-security application, it
simply rejects the rule(s) without offering a fine-grained violation resolution.
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Chapter 3
MEDIATING POLICY CONFLICTS FOR SDN APPLICATIONS
3.1 Introduction
Traditional network environment is ill-suited to meet the requirements of today’s
enterprises, carriers, and end users. Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is recently
introduced as a new network paradigm which is able to provide unprecedented pro-
grammability, automation, and network control by decoupling the control and data
planes, and logically centralizing network intelligence and state [49]. In SDN, net-
work applications can communicate with the SDN controller via an open interface and
define network-wide policies based on a global view of the network provided by the
controller. The SDN controller, which resides in the control plane, manages network
services and provides an abstract view of the network to the application plane. At the
same time, the controller translates policies defined by applications into actual packet
processing rules which are identifiable by the data plane. As the first standard for
SDN, OpenFlow [86] helps generate a set of flow rules to enforce network-wide poli-
cies in physical devices. Each flow rule specifies a pattern that matches on bits in the
packet header, actions that are performed on matching packets to describe packet
forwarding, packet modification or packet dropping, a priority that disambiguates
among overlapping patterns, and timeouts that allow a switch to delete expired rules.
The multi-layered SDN architecture significantly helps manage and process net-
work flows. However, each layer of SDN architecture heavily relies on complicated
network policies and managing those policies in SDN requires not only dedicated
cautions but also considerable efforts. Our study reveals that such a multi-layered
14
architecture brings great challenges in policy management for SDN as follows:
• Policy management in SDN application plane: An SDN application could
employ multiple modules, such as access control, load-balancing, routing and
monitoring, to process the same flow and generates various functional policies
by composing rules produced by those modules [57, 89]. However, policy com-
position is not a trivial task, since rules generated by a single module may
overlap each other (intra-module dependency) and rules from one module may
also overlap with rules from other modules (inter-module dependency). Thus,
policy composition should address issues caused by both intra-module and inter-
module dependencies.
• Policy management in SDN control plane: In SDN control plane, there
may exist multiple SDN applications running on top of a controller and they
might jointly process the same traffic flow. In such a situation, flow rules gen-
erated by different application for processing the same flow may also overlap
each other (inter-application dependency) and lead to policy conflicts [56, 95].
• Policy management in SDN data plane: In SDN data plane, different flows
may go through the same switches and flow rules defining different flows in the
same flow table may also overlap each other. We call this situation intra-table
dependency. In this case, unintended flow path modification could happen.
To address above challenges, we propose a framework for robust policy manage-
ment (RPM) in SDN with respect to three planes in SDN architecture. In SDN
application plane, we introduce a policy segmentation mechanism to compute and
resolve intra-module and inter-module dependencies and enable a secure and efficient
policy generation. Our novel policy segmentation mechanism generates a number of
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disjoint segments which are able to identify various dependencies and thereby allow
to automatically remove those dependencies. In SDN control plane, our framework
identifies inter-application dependencies with the help of policy segmentation mech-
anism and resolves the dependency relations through two ways in terms of different
situations. On one hand, if different applications are desired to collaboratively pro-
cess the same flow, our framework composes policies produced by those applications .
On the other hand, when the applications are mutually exclusive and each time only
one application is allowed to process the flow, our framework breaks inter-application
dependencies by assigning policies from different application with different priorities.
Lastly, we propose an flow isolation mechanism for removing intra-table dependencies
to address conflicting flows in SDN data plane.
The major contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• We present various challenges in SDN policy management with respect to three
planes, application, control and data planes, in the multi-layered SDN architec-
ture.
• We propose a comprehensive framework to enable a robust policy management
in SDN based on three layers of SDN architecture. A set of systematic resolution
strategies are introduced for different layers in our framework.
• We provide a prototype implementation of our framework in an open SDN con-
troller. We evaluate our solution using a real-world network configuration and
an emulated OpenFlow network. Our experimental results show that our imple-
mentation has low performance overhead to enable effective policy management
for SDN.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.3.2 overviews our framework and
presents policy management challenges and corresponding resolution strategies based
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on three planes in SDN architecture. In Section 6.6, we introduce our implementation
details and evaluations followed by related work discussed in Section 6.9. Section 6.10
concludes the chapter.
3.2 Robust Policy Management (RPM) Framework
3.2.1 Overview
We first present our RPM framework which enables robust policy management
for SDN in terms of three planes of SDN architecture: (1) SDN application plane; (2)
SDN control plane; and (3) SDN data plane.
App 1
MonitorRoute LBFW
Traffic Flow 1
Security Module Non-Security Module
App 2
MonitorRoute LBFW
Traffic Flow 2
Security Module Non-Security Module
App 3
Data layer
Application
layer
Control
layer
Figure 3.1: Multi-layered SDN Policy Management: (1) Application Plane; (2)
Control Plane; and (3) Data Plane.
In SDN application plane, a main issue comes from policy composition where
intra-module and inter-module dependencies should be addressed. Partially or en-
tirely overlapped rules in a module make nontrivial intra-module dependencies and
complicate the process of policy composition. In addition, inter-module dependen-
cies between security and non-security modules may cause security challenges due to
incomplete policy composition. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, we investigate inefficient
and insecure policy composition issues and introduce our policy generation algorithm
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along with a policy segmentation mechanism to address such issues.
In SDN control plane, multiple applications processing the same flow may cause
inter-application dependencies. As shown in Figure 3.1, App 2 and App 3 is processing
the same flow, Flow 2, and the flow policies produced by two applications may conflict
with each other. In order to identify inter-application dependencies, we recall the
policy segmentation mechanism in the first layer and obtain overlapping segments
which indicates the rule dependency relations. We consider two resolution strategies
in this layer. First, we compose policies generated by different applications and
allow them to jointly process the same flow. Second, we break inter-application
dependencies by assign dependent rules with different priorities.
In SDN data plane, OpenFlow-enabled switches store flow rules into the flow
tables by their priorities. A rule defining one flow, such as Flow 1 in Figure 3.1,
with a lower priority might be affected by a rule for another flow, such as Flow 2 in
Figure 3.1, with a higher priority, causing intra-table dependency. Since intra-table
dependencies might change the behaviors of associated flows, our framework provides
two flow isolation mechanisms, flow rerouting and flow tagging, to address such a
issue.
3.2.2 Policy Management in SDN Application Plane
In this section, we first explore various considerations and policy management
challenges in SDN Application Plane. We then present our fine-grained policy com-
position mechanism in the RPM framework.
Considerations and Challenges
An SDN application generally employs several network modules to build multi-functional
policies. While an application with multiple modules processes a traffic flow, funda-
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mental considerations are intra-module and inter-module dependencies. To illustrate
policy composition issues, we adopt two kinds of composition operators introduced
in [89]. “Parallel” composition operator (|) means the union of two modules and
generates a set of packet processing rules which should be applied to the same flow
simultaneously. “Sequential” composition operator (≫) stands for serialization of
modules so that the matching rules would be performed one by one on a flow. We
next investigate several policy management challenges in SDN application plane.
Firewall Policy
r1: src = 10.0.x.x, dst = 1.2.3.x → deny
r2: dst = 1.2.3.4 → allow
r3: src = 10.0.0.x, dst = 1.2.3.x → deny
Load-balance Policy
r4: src = 10.0.1.1, dst = 1.2.x.x → src = 10.2.2.2
Route Policy
r5: src = 10.0.0.x, dst = 1.2.3.4 → fwd(1)
r6: src = 10.2.2.2, dst = 1.2.x.x → fwd(2)
r7: src = 10.2.2.2, dst = 1.2.3.x → fwd(3)
Monitor Policy
r8: src = 10.0.1.1, dst = 1.2.10.11 → count
r9: src = 10.1.x.x, dst = 1.2.3.4 → count
Figure 3.2: Sample Policies Defined by Four Different Network Modules.
1. Intra-module dependency: Assume that there exist four different modules, Fire-
wall, Load-balance (LB), Route and Monitor, which can be used by an SDN
application. And each module produces several rules which are ordered by their
priorities as shown in Figure 3.2. In Firewall policy, r1, r2, and r3 are mutu-
ally dependent. Thus, computing intra-module dependencies in Firewall policy
requires considerable efforts. Computing dependencies in Route policy is rela-
tively easy, since r6 is a superset of r7 and r7 is not visible in the network. On
the other hand, LB and Monitor policies do not have any intra-module depen-
dencies.
2. Inter-module dependency: Computing inter-module dependencies is more tricky.
In Figure 3.2, we can observe that r1 is dependent with r4 and r5, r2 is de-
pendent with r9, and r3 is dependent with r5. Therefore, Firewall policy is
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dependent with all other modules’ policies. But Route policy is only dependent
with Firewall policy, since r5 is dependent with r1, r2, and r3. As discussed
above, computing inter-module dependencies by pair-wise comparison requires
considerable efforts.
3. Insecure composition caused by inter-module dependency: We now explore prob-
lematic issues potentially caused by inter-module dependencies. We first assume
that two modules are sequentially composed, Firewall≫ LB. Since r1 and r4
internally overlap with each other, the packets matching r4 will be blocked by
r1. However, if we consider an opposite composition sequence, LB ≫ Firewall,
r4 in LB modifies packets’ source IP address to 10.2.2.2 and r1 in Firewall can-
not block these packets. In such a case, we argue that inaccurate composition
sequence may cause security breaches in the network.
4. Inefficient composition caused by intra-module and inter-module dependencies:
A programmer may want to compose two modules in parallel such as Firewall |
Route. In Figure 3.2, we could observe that all rules in Firewall policy are
dependent with r5. Since r1 has the highest priority, r1 and r5 are jointly
combined and we can obtain the following rule: src = 10.0.0.x, dst = 1.2.3.4 −→
deny, fwd(1). Indeed, r5 is not necessary to compose with Firewall rules, since
the Firewall rule, r1, already blocks packets matching the rule pattern. In
addition, composing r6 and r7 with Firewall policy is also invalid since r7 should
not appear in the network. Therefore, we argue that it is obviously inefficient to
always compose the multiple policies and install them into the network switches
like Pyretic [89] does.
As discussed above, we need to pay special attention on addressing challenges
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in this layer. First, treating every module equally sometimes evades security policies
such as a firewall policy. Since a firewall policy is generally considered more important
than policies produced by other modules, distinguishing security modules from non-
security modules is vital for secure policy composition. Second, commodity SDN
switches with limited ternary content addressable memory (TCAM) space typically
support only a few thousands of rules [72, 117]. Thus, we should also strive to provide
mechanisms with respect to an efficient policy composition.
Efficient Policy Generation
To efficiently compose policies generated by different modules of an SDN application,
we group security modules and non-security modules separately and carefully examine
the inter-module dependencies between security modules and non-security modules.
Incoming
packet
src = 10.0.1.1
dst = 1.2.3.x
LB »
r4
FW »
r1
r2
r3
drop
(a) Inefficient flow rule generation
Incoming
packet
src = 10.0.1.1
dst = 1.2.3.x
LB
r4
FW :
r1
r2
r3
drop
(b) Efficient flow rule generation
Figure 3.3: Comparison Between Inefficient and Efficient Flow Rule Generation.
Figure 3.3 shows an example comparing inefficient policy generation mechanism
and our solution. In Figure 3.3a, Firewall and Load-balance (LB) modules are com-
posed sequentially so that only legitimate packets can traverse the network. In this
case, the generated packet processing rule contains an unnecessary rule, r4, which
modifies source IP address to 10.2.2.2. Such an extra operation will impose overhead
to the production network. In contrast, our approach ignores subsequent policies
generated by non-security modules if security modules deny matching packets. Fig-
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ure 3.3b illustrates our approach where r1 drops the matching packets immediately
without the processing of r4. We use a new notation (:) to indicate our policy gener-
ation operation.
Policy Segmentation
The major goal of our framework in this layer is to remove intra-module and inter-
module dependencies for policy composition. In order to achieve such a goal, com-
puting these dependencies is essential. Since SDN applications can obtain a global
view of network, our segmentation algorithm also adopts global data structure which
allows us to compute intra-module and inter-module dependencies at the same time.
Our policy segmentation mechanism generates a set of disjoint segments.
Definition 1 (Segment). A segment is a 4-tuple {sid, ms,Ra, OR}, where sid is a
segment identifier, ms is a matching space of segment, Ra is a set of active rules, and
OR is a set of overlapping rules. An element of Ra is selected from OR by finding out
a rule having the highest priority in the overlapping rule set associated with a module.
Therefore, Ra ⊆ OR.
Our policy segmentation mechanism globally examines overlapping rules and com-
putes distinct matching space in order to remove intra-module and inter-module
dependencies. To compute dependencies, we record all overlapping rules in each
segment. Overlapping rules indicate those rules are possibly have intra-module or
inter-module dependencies so that we could remove all dependencies and obtain ac-
tive rules. Active rules are completely applicable to process matching packets because
dependencies in corresponding overlapping segments could be completely removed.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode of our policy segmentation mechanism. We
first insert security policies into a set of disjoint segments. As shown in lines 17-40
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Algorithm 1: Policy Segmentation Algorithm.
Input: A security policy Ps and non-security policies Pns = {P1, · · · , Pk}.
Output: A set of segments S.
1 PolicySegmentation(R)
2 S.New();
3 /*Insert security module rules*/
4 R←− GetRule(Ps);
5 foreach r ∈ R do
6 S ←− InsertRule(S, r);
7 end
8 /*Insert non-security module rules*/
9 foreach P ∈ Pns do
10 S.AppendModuleSeperator();
11 R←− GetRule(P );
12 foreach r ∈ R do
13 S ←− InsertRule(S, r);
14 end
15 end
16 /*Compute active/inactive rules in each module*/
17 foreach s ∈ S do
18 s←− ComputeActiveRule(s);
19 end
20 return S;
21 InsertRule(S, r)
22 sn ←−MatchingSpace(r);
23 sn.OverlappingRules.Append(r);
24 foreach s ∈ S do
25 /* sn.ms is a subset of s.ms*/
26 if sn.ms ⊂ s.ms then
27 s.ms←− s.ms \ sn.ms;
28 sn.OverlappingRules.Append(s.OverlappingRules);
29 S.Append(sn);
30 break;
31 end
32 /* sn.ms is a superset of s.ms*/
33 else if sn.ms ⊃ s.ms then
34 sn.ms←− sn.ms \ s.ms;
35 s.OverlappingRules.Append(sn.OverlappingRules);
36 end
37 /* sn.ms partially matches s.ms*/
38 else if sn.ms ∩ s.ms 6= ∅ then
39 sc.New();
40 sc.ms←− sn.ms ∩ s.ms;
41 sc.OverlappingRules.Append(sn.OverlappingRules ∪ s.OverlappingRules);
42 S.Append(sc);
43 s.ms←− s.ms \ sc.ms;
44 sn.ms←− sn.ms \ sc.ms;
45 end
46 end
47 S.Append(sn);
48 return S;
49 ComputeActiveRule(s)
50 if s.OverlappingRules ∩ Ps 6= ∅ then
51 R←− s.OverlappingRules ∩ Ps;
52 s.ActiveRules.Append(GetHighPriorityRule(R));
53 if s.RuleType = deny then
54 return s;
55 end
56 end
57 else
58 foreach P ∈ Pns do
59 if s.OverlappingRules∩ P 6= ∅ then
60 R←− s.OverlappingRules∩ P ;
61 s.ActiveRules.Append(GetHighPriorityRule(R));
62 continue;
63 end
64 end
65 end
66 return s;
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in Algorithm 1, InsertRule function computes disjoint matching space of a segment
and substitutes newly updated matching space to old one for resident segments. At
the same time, each segment stacks up overlapping rules. A function called Compute-
ActiveRule generates active rules of segments (lines 41-53). To achieve an efficient
policy generation, this function compares denying rules first (line 45) so that it only
obtains active denying rule without computing additional relations.
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Figure 3.4: Policy Segmentation.
For example, assume that a programmer installs two rules r6 and r7. Since r6
has no dependent rules, our algorithm will add a segment, s9, directly. Regarding r7,
it examines if the relation between r6 and r7 satisfies one of the following relations:
subset, superset, partial match, or disjoint. Since r7 is a subset of r6, we compute
intersection between r7 and s9. Then, Algorithm 1 appends new segment s10 and
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updates overlapping rules of s10. After appending a set of segments, Algorithm 1 calls
ComputeActiveRule function to compute active/inactive rules. Since there doesn’t
exist denying rule, both segments, s9 and s10, choose r6 as their active rules.
Figure 3.4 illustrates a detailed policy segmentation. The OR of segment s1 are
r2 and r9. Ra is the same as OR, since r2 and r9 are defined in different modules.
However, Ra of segment s10 is r6, since r6 and r7 are defined in the same module and
the priority of r6 is higher than the priority of r7. Note that our algorithm applies
different operations on segments s4 and s6. Since they have a denying rule r1 as an
active firewall rule, the rest of overlapping rules are ignored.
Policy Composition
Algorithm 2 presents how our policy composition mechanism leverages the results
of policy segmentation to generate composed policies. This algorithm imports a set
of segments S and composing definition D, which consists of two modules with the
composition operator. Policy segmentation provides a set of disjoint segments with
corresponding active rules in each segment. The algorithm only computes active
rules in each segment (lines 5-20) and checks M1 first. If any element of active rules
overlaps withM1, the algorithm keeps composing withM2. Since the algorithm deals
with two kinds of composition operators, it performs two different tasks, sequential
composition and parallel composition.
3.2.3 Policy Management in SDN Control Plane
If different applications attempt to process the same flow, there may exist control
plane conflicts caused by inter-application dependencies. We describe such conflicts
in depth with a motivating example and provide corresponding resolution strategies.
25
Algorithm 2: Policy Composition
Input: A set of segments S and composing definition D = {M1,M2, type}, where D.type = {≫, |}.
Output: A set of packet processing rule PR = {pr1, pr2, · · · , prk}, such that pri = {ms, action}.
1 PolicyComposition(S,D)
2 PR.New();
3 /*Insert security module rules*/
4 foreach s ∈ S do
5 if s.ActiveRules ∩D.M1 6= ∅ then
6 pr.New();
7 pr.ms←− s.ms;
8 pr.action←− (s.ActiveRules ∩D.M1).action;
9 if D.type =′≫′ then
10 if s.ActiveRules ∩D.M2 6= ∅ then
11 pr.action←− pr.action ∪ (s.ActiveRules ∩D.M2).action;
12 end
13 else
14 temp.ms←− ComputeMachingSpace(pr.ms,pr.action);
15 if IsDependent(temp.ms,D.M2) then
16 pr.action←− pr.action ∪ ComputeNextAction(temp.ms,D.M2);
17 end
18 end
19 end
20 else if D.type =′|′ then
21 if s.ActiveRules ∩D.M2 6= ∅ then
22 pr.action←− pr.action ∪ (s.ActiveRules ∩D.M2).action;
23 end
24 end
25 PR.Append(pr);
26 end
27 else if s.ActiveRules ∩D.M2 6= ∅ then
28 pr.New();
29 pr.ms←− s.ms;
30 pr.action←− (s.ActiveRules ∩D.M2).action;
31 PR.Append(pr);
32 end
33 end
34 return PR;
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Inter-application Dependency
In this layer, our framework deals with inter-application dependencies when different
applications process the same flow. The root cause of those dependencies is that each
application wants to enforce its own policy over other policies in order to process the
same flow. Figure 3.5 illustrates those dependencies more precisely.
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Figure 3.5: Different Applications Cause Control Plane Conflicts While Managing
the Same Flow.
The APP 1 composes Load-balance (LB), Route, and Monitor modules sequen-
tially contrary to the APP 2 which composes Monitor module first. Incoming packets
matching source IP address 10.0.1.1 and destination IP address 1.2.10.11 is managed
by two different applications since both r4 in LB and r8 in Monitor have been defined
to handle these packets. The APP 1 accepts a packet and modifies source IP address
to 10.2.2.2 and forwards it to port 2 and counts it sequentially. On the other hand,
the APP 2 drops it after counting it because there exist no matching rules in Route
and Monitor modules. Runtime will generate these flow rules at the same time so
that there exist confusion on production network.
In order to identify these conflicts, we need to recall policy segmentation mech-
anism in order to extract Ra of each segment. As shown in Figure 3.4, policy seg-
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mentation indicates Ra of s7 is r4 and r8. So we obtain the new overlapping module
set, ORM = {LB,Monitor}, since r4 ∈ LB and r8 ∈ Monitor. And let us make
another set A1, and A2 for the APPs 1 and 2 to enumerate modules used by each
application, A1 = {LB,Route,Monitor} and A2 = {Monitor, Route, LB}. Since
A1 ∩A2 = {LB,Route,Monitor} ⊇ ORM = {LB,Monitor}, we conclude that there
exist potential conflicts between two applications. It is easy to detect whether dif-
ferent applications have potential conflicts or not. If ORM is a subset of ∩iMi, we
conclude that these applications have potential conflicts.
Resolution Strategy
We consider two situations: one is that different applications are allowed to jointly
combine each policy and another is that application are mutually exclusive. For the
first case, we accept inter-application dependency so that we apply parallel composi-
tion operator to combine two policies. As an alternative, we remove inter-application
dependency by assigning different priorities to conflicting applications. By assigning
different priorities to conflicting applications, we enforce the policy defined by the
application having the higher priority for the same flow. And we also enforce one
of policies in a similar way by assigning different priorities to the applications. For
example, an application that employs security module may have a upper priority so
that this application takes the precedence over other normal applications. Different
conflict resolution strategies proposed by our previous work [66] could be also applied
to resolve inter-application dependencies caused by conflicting applications.
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3.2.4 Policy Management in SDN Data Plane
Intra-table Dependency
Different applications normally do not make any problematic issues when they manage
two distinct flows. However, if the flow paths of the different flows overlap each other,
intra-table dependency should be identified to check potential violations.
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Figure 3.6: Two Applications Manage Two Different Flows.
For example, there exist two traffic flows processed by different applications as
shown in Figure 3.6. An application, App 1, generates the flow rule which accepts
the packet matching source IP address 10.2.2.2 and destination IP address 1.2.3.4
and forwards to the port 2. On the other hand, another application, App 2, priorities
combines two network modules so that it obtains the flow rule which accepts different
packet and modifies source IP address to 10.2.2.2 and forwards to the port 2. Even
though incoming packets are different, flow space [108] of outgoing packets are over-
lapped so that one of applications might lose its control of the flow. In particular, if
different flows have common visiting switch along with their flow paths, the flows can
be affected by different priorities so that original flow paths would be changed.
29
Resolution Strategy
Our goal in this layer is to remove intra-table dependency through flow isolation.
To achieve this goal, we consider two flow isolation methods, flow tagging and flow
rerouting.
Inspired by the approach discussed in [54], which utilizes tags to distinguish
packets belonging to different versions of policies for ensuring consistent network
updates, we can use tags to delete the dependencies. In this mechanism, the new flow
policy is preprocessed by adding a tag to differentiate the match pattern with other
policies. The rule of the policy in the ingress switch will take additional action on the
packets to stamp them with the same tag. As the packets leave the network, in the
egress switch, the corresponding rule of the policy will strip the tag from the packets.
Using flow rerouting, when a flow path causes an intra-table dependency, we
request the controller to find another routing path for the policy to avoid the depen-
dency. During this process, we maintain a list called switch evading list that contains
all switches associated with the intra-table dependency. We provide such a list to the
controller, and then the controller will calculate a new routing path ignoring those
switches in the list to break the dependency.
3.3 Implementation and Evaluation
We have implemented our framework on top of an open SDN controller, Flood-
light [11]. Our proof-of-concept implementation consists of three major components:
(1) policy generation; (2) policy segmentation; and (3) resolution strategy. The pol-
icy generation component imports policies created by applications to generate multi-
functional policies, which are then used by the controller to generate corresponding
flow rules and install them in OpenFlow-enabled switches. The policy segmentation
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component captures every flow rule to produce a set of segments, which are able to
identify intra-module and inter-module dependencies. The resolution strategy compo-
nent obtains a global view of network from the Floodlight controller using northbound
APIs [11] and implements different resolution strategies as described in Section 5.3.2.
All of our experiments were performed with Floodlight v0.90 and Mininet v2.1.0 [22].
We obtained a real-work network configuration from Stanford backbone network [13],
which has 26 switches with corresponding ACL rules, for our experiments. We re-
moved redundant ACL rules and converted them to a firewall policy and in turn
obtained 1, 206 firewall rules in total. At the same time, we generated 8, 908 network
rules by parsing original network rules existing in Stanford network configuration to
Floodlight-recognizable rules. Because these network rules contain routing rules as
well as rewriting rules, we assume that these rules are generated by two modules,
Route and Load-balance (LB) modules.
Our policy generation mechanism enables efficiently composing multiple modules
and in turn generating a number of flow rules. To evaluate our policy generation
mechanism, we performed experiments in two ways: (1) Firewall : (Route|LB) 1 ;
and (2) Firewall >> (Route|LB). Suppose we only have one denying rule in firewall
policy which blocks a number of network rules.
Without our policy generation mechanism, in case (2), the system generates ex-
actly the same number of rules, | Firewall | + | (Route|LB) |, which is the worst
case shown in Figure 3.7. Every single rule in (Route|LB) may overlap with fire-
wall policy. Thus, in the best case, our mechanism only generates firewall rules
without (Route|LB) rules. The average case means that half of (Route|LB) rules
overlap with firewall policy. Thus, the system installs the following number of rules,
| Firewall | +1
2
| (Route|LB) |. As shown in Figure 3.7, the best case constantly
1Note that our operator (:) means that it adopts our policy generation mechanism.
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Figure 3.7: Comparison Between Inefficient VS. Efficient Policy Generation Mech-
anism.
takes only 3 milliseconds for both generating and installing flow rules to correspond-
ing switches. On the other hand, the deployment time of the worst case increases
dramatically in accordance with the growing number of rules in (Route|LB).
To evaluate computing overheads of our policy segmentation mechanism, we in-
stalled all network rules into the network and measured the updating time of pol-
icy segments. As a result, 456 segments out of 688 firewall rules were produced
by the policy segmentation mechanism, 8, 273 segments out of 8, 908 network rules
were generated, and we got 8, 729 segments in total. Because there exist some
redundant rules, the number of segments is less than the total number of rules,
| Firewall | + | (Route | LB) |. 75% of updates have been finished within 0.2
milliseconds and most of cases (98%) have been computed less than 0.5 milliseconds.
We also evaluated the performance of two resolution strategies: assigning priorities
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Figure 3.9: Evaluation of Two Resolution Strategies: Assigning Priorities for the
SDN Control Plane and Updating VLAN Field for the SDN Data Plane.
for the SDN control plane and updating VLAN field for the SDN data plane. Both
resolution strategies update a set of rules which define conflicting flows. First, we
measured elapsed time for assigning priorities of rules. As shown in Figure 3.9, the
elapsed time grows in accordance with the growing number of rules per flow. Similarly,
we checked the elapsed time for updating VLAN field for isolating conflicting flows.
The elapsed time increases with the growing number of rules per flow, but it generally
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took more time than the assigning priorities case, since the systems spent more time
finding out ingress/egress switches of the flows to add and strip VLAN tags.
3.4 Related Work
Modular network programming has recently received considerable attention in
SDN community [109, 57, 89, 77, 45]. However, this area is still immature and needs
in-depth investigation in terms of security and effectiveness of module composition.
Pyretic [89] enables a program to combine different policies generated by different
modules together using policy composition operators. Then, combined policies can
be propagated and enforced at SDN switches. However, lacking a policy dependency
detection mechanism in Pyretic, it is obviously inefficient to always compose the mul-
tiple policies and install them into the network switches. Although FRESCO [109]
deals with security application development framework using modular programming
for SDN, it couldn’t directly handle dependencies between modules in SDN appli-
cations. In contrast, our framework deals with various dependencies such as intra-
module, inter-module, inter-application, and intra-table dependencies for robust SDN
policy management.
Many research efforts have been recently devoted to the policy validation and enforce-
ment mechanism in SDN due to programmability of SDN. Traditional policy checking
mechanism such as binary decision diagrams (BDD) has been widely employed for
checking anomalies of a firewall [66, 123, 52] which is not efficient for verifying real-
time systems. Newly emerging network analysis tools such as NetPlumber [74] and
VeriFlow [75] support real-time validation and verification of networks. Several mid-
dlebox approaches [97, 54] can deal with dynamic packet modification made by a
number of rewriting flow rules in OpenFlow networks. Meanwhile, NICE [44] was
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proposed to adopt a model-checking framework which utilizes symbolic execution to
automate testing process for OpenFlow applications. Even though our policy man-
agement framework imposes manageable overheads in SDN policy management, we
will further study a more practical and efficient mechanism supporting analysis and
enforcement of network policies in real time.
3.5 Conclusion
We investigated numerous problematic issues and security challenges in SDN pol-
icy management and proposed a novel framework to facilitate robust policy manage-
ment for SDN with respect to three planes in the SDN architecture. In the SDN
application plane, we introduced an efficient policy composition mechanism along
with a policy segmentation technique to address the issue created by the situation
where one application with multiple modules jointly precess the same flow. We also
discussed approaches to address the inter-application dependency issue in the SDN
control plane. Lastly, we provided flow isolation technique to address the intra-table
dependency issue in the SDN data plane. Our experimental results showed that our
solution is effective and only introduce manageable performance overheads to enable
robust SDN policy management.
As our future work, we will extend our framework to support dynamic policy up-
dates. In that case, a more sophisticated composition mechanism should be designed
to consider both policy revocation and recomposition situations. In addition, since
our current framework only deals with policy management challenges with respect to
one SDN controller, we would like to expand our solution to support comprehensive
SDN policy management in terms of heterogeneous controllers.
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Chapter 4
FLOWGUARD: ENABLE STATELESS NETWORK POLICY MANAGEMENT
4.1 Introduction
Over the past few years, Software-Defined Networking (SDN) has evolved from
purely an idea [47, 46, 60] to a new paradigm that various networking vendors are
not only embracing, but also pursuing as their model for future enterprise network
management. As the first standard for SDN, OpenFlow [86] essentially separates
the control plane and the data plane of a network device, and enables the network
control to become directly programmable as well as the underlying infrastructure to
be abstracted for network applications. With OpenFlow, only the data plane exists in
the network device, and all control decisions are communicated to the device through
a logically-centralized controller.
One primary goal of SDN is to enable various network applications, which are
basically network services, to run on the controller to manage the network directly by
configuring packet-handling mechanisms in underlying devices. Consequently, when
enterprises adopt OpenFlow for their networks, it is virtually inevitable that legacy
security applications such as firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems
(IDS/IPS) have to be migrated to OpenFlow-based networks by re-designing and
implementing them as compatible security applications. In this chapter, we focus
on the challenges of designing and implementing a reliable firewall application for
OpenFlow-based networks.
Firewalls are the most widely deployed security mechanism in most businesses and
institutions. A conventional firewall sits on the border between a private network and
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the public Internet, and examine all incoming and outgoing packets to defend against
attacks and unauthorized access. However, one key assumption under this traditional
model is that all insiders of the protected network are trusted, since internal traffic
is not seen and cannot be filtered by the firewall [68]. That assumption has been
invalid for a long time, because insiders could easily launch attacks on others inside
the network by circumventing security mechanisms [104]. With OpenFlow, such a
problem could be potentially alleviated, since OpenFlow offers a deeper level of control
granularity via placing enforcement points in any entries of traffic flows in a network.
Unfortunately, OpenFlow also brings great challenges for designing firewall appli-
cations in emerging SDNs. First, OpenFlow allows various Set-Field actions, which
can rewrite the values of respective header fields in packets. Such a feature can sig-
nificantly increase the usefulness of an OpenFlow implementation. For example, a
load balancer application may need to dynamically change flow paths and destina-
tions. However, malicious OpenFlow applications could also leverage this feature to
strategically enable flow rules that would evade security mechanisms 1 . Second, in
an OpenFlow network, network states are dynamically updated and configurations
are frequently changed. Thus, simply checking policy violations against new traf-
fic flows in a firewall application is not effective since security violations induced by
other changes of network states and configurations–such as updating flow entries and
firewall rules–should be examined as well. Last but not least, when a security vio-
lation is detected, firewall applications cannot plainly reject the new flow rule(s) or
remove resident flow rule(s) that causes the violation. In OpenFlow, multiple traffic
flows may match the same rule. Also, OpenFlow allows using wildcard rules to define
a flow. In these cases, if only partial packets matching a rule violate the firewall
policy, eliminating the rule may drop legal traffic which in turn could encumber the
1We further articulate such scenarios in Section 4.3.2.
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availability and utility of network services.
Therefore, we observe that OpenFlow not only presents tremendous opportunities
to networking, but also changes the way of defining network security appliances,
including firewalls. As a robust security solution, we claim that an OpenFlow-based
firewall application should have following properties: (1) monitoring network insiders;
(2) tracking dynamic packet modifications; (3) examining various network state and
configuration changes; (4) providing fine-grained violation resolution; and (5) enabling
real-time network protection.
An exemplar firewall application based on OpenFlow has been introduced in
Floodlight [11], a popular open SDN controller, which enforces security rules against
traffic flows by monitoring all packet-in behaviors in a network. Nevertheless, this
preliminary implementation only inspects a traffic flow at its ingress switch and lacks
a capability to actively monitor packet modifications. In other words, once a flow
passes the ingress switch, modified packets cannot be further inspected by the fire-
wall. Also, it can only examine violations when a new flow comes in the network, but
cannot check any other network updates.
In this chapter, we propose FlowGuard, a new firewall application, which is de-
signed to facilitate not only accurate detection but also effective resolution of firewall
policy violations, and support network-wide access control in dynamic OpenFlow net-
works. FlowGuard detects violations by examining flow path space against firewall
authorization space. The violation detection approach in FlowGuard is capable of
tracking flow paths in the entire network and checking rule dependencies [74, 122]
in both flow tables and firewall policies. Besides, FlowGuard can determine vio-
lations dynamically when network states or configurations are changed. In addition,
we introduce a flexible violation resolution framework in FlowGuard to enable a
fine-grained violation resolution with the help of four resolution strategies, namely
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dependency breaking, update rejecting, flow removing, and packet blocking, considering
diverse update situations in both flow entries and firewall rules. In order to ensure
real-time response in FlowGuard, we also address several optimization considera-
tions in the FlowGuard design.
The major contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• We present security challenges and design requirements in building a firewall
application for OpenFlow networks with respect to both packet modifications
and rule dependencies in flow tables and firewall policies.
• We propose a systematic solution for designing an OpenFlow-based firewall ap-
plication that enables network-wide access control in dynamic OpenFlow net-
works. Our design addresses challenges created by the inter-reaction of flow
path and firewall authorization space, and facilitates not only accurate detection
but also effective resolution of firewall policy violations in OpenFlow networks.
• We provide a prototype implementation of FlowGuard in an open SDN con-
troller. We evaluate FlowGuard using a real-world network topology and
an emulated OpenFlow network. Our experimental results show that Flow-
Guard has low performance overhead to enable real-time violation detection
and resolution.
This chapter is organized as follows. We overview related work in Section 6.8.
Section 4.3 overviews the security challenges and design requirements in constructing
an OpenFlow-based firewall application. Section 4.4 presents the design of Flow-
Guard in detail. We address the implementation and the evaluation of FlowGuard
in Section 5.5. Section 6.9 describes several important issues and our future work.
We conclude this chapter in Section 6.10.
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4.2 Related Work
Several recent efforts have been devoted to address various security challenges,
such as scanning attack prevention [69, 87], DDoS attack detection [42], vulnerability
assessment [39, 78], and saturation attack mitigation [110], in SDNs. Differentiating
from those work, our work focuses on exploring how to build reliable firewalls for
SDNs.
Floodlight contains a firewall application [11] where each packet-in behavior trig-
gered by the first packet of a traffic flow is matched against the set of existing firewall
rules that allow or deny a flow at its ingress switch. However, such a primitive imple-
mentation of OpenFlow-based firewall application suffers from a couple of limitations
as discussed before. Pyretic [89] was recently introduced as a higher-level language
in the Frenetic Project [57] that allows SDN programmers to write modular network
applications, including firewall application. Pyretic’s sequential composition opera-
tors could potentially resolve direct policy conflicts by compiling conflicting policies
into a prioritized rule set. However, lacking a flow tracking capability [54], Pyretic
cannot discover and resolve indirect security violations caused by dynamic packet
modifications. FortNOX [95] was proposed as a software extension aiming to provide
security constraint enforcement for OpenFlow controllers, being able to identify in-
direct security violations. FortNOX was then used as a security enforcement kernel
for FRESCO [109], an OpenFlow security application development framework. How-
ever, we cannot directly adopt FortNOX approach to design our firewall application by
virtue of several reasons. On one hand, the rule conflict analysis algorithm provided
by FortNOX records rule relations in alias sets, which are unable to accurately track
all flows. In particular, the conflict detection algorithm in FortNOX only conducts
pairwise conflict analysis between new flow rule(s) and each single security constraint
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without considering rule dependencies within flow tables [74, 75] and among security
constraints (represented as a firewall policy in our approach) [63, 122]. On the other
hand, when FortNOX detects a security violation caused by new rule(s) installed by
a non-security application, it simply rejects the rule(s) without offering a fine-grained
violation resolution.
A couple of verification tools [35, 74, 73, 76, 85] for checking network invariants
and policy correctness in OpenFlow networks have been proposed. Anteater [85]
detects violations of network invariants using a SAT solver through transferring the
data-plane information to boolean expressions and converting network invariants into
instances of SAT problem. FlowChecker [35] translates network policies into boolean
expressions and uses Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) to model the network state for
checking network invariants. However, both Anteater and FlowChecker are static in
nature and could not scale well to dynamic changes in the network. VeriFlow [76]
and NetPlumber [74] are capable of checking the compliance of network updates
with specified invariants in real time. VeriFlow uses graph search techniques to verify
network-wide invariants and deals with dynamic changes. NetPlumber utilizes Header
Space Analysis (HSA) [73] in an incremental manner to ensure real-time response for
checking network policies through building a dependency graph. Even though these
tools can be potentially used to detect firewall policy violations, they could not provide
automatic and effective violation resolution. Also, they ignore rule dependencies
within security constraints, such as firewall policies, for compliance checking.
Policy verification tools discussed above are able to check network reachability
and potentially utilized for tracking flow paths in OpenFlow networks. However,
Anteater [85] and FlowChecker [35] are indeed offline systems and cannot be applied
for real-time flow tracking. VeriFlow [75] can perform reachability checking in real
time, but it does not support dynamic packet modifications. Another option for flow
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tracking would be FlowTags [54], which can additionally deal with dynamic trans-
formations in the presence of legacy middleboxes (e.g., proxies). However, FlowTags
needs to alter existing OpenFlow architecture. In this work, we leverage the mecha-
nism introduced by NetPlumber [74] to track flow paths for firewall policy violation
detection, since NetPlumber provides a couple of features that fit for our purpose, such
as support for arbitrary header modifications, automatic rule dependency detection,
and real-time response.
Numerous firewall algorithms and tools have been designed to assist system ad-
ministrators in managing and analyzing firewall policies [36, 37, 38, 122]. Especially,
some work has presented policy analysis tools with the goal of detecting firewall pol-
icy conflicts. Al-Shaer and Hamed [36] designed a tool called Firewall Policy Advisor
to detect pairwise anomalies in firewall rules. Yuan et al. [122] presented FIREMAN,
a toolkit to check for misconfigurations in firewall policies through static analysis.
However, existing firewall policy analysis tools only detect policy conflicts within a
firewall policy, but cannot be directly applied to deal with firewall policy violations
against flow policies in dynamic OpenFlow networks.
4.3 Background Technologies and Challenges
Before introducing the design of FlowGuard, we first briefly introduce the con-
cepts of flow policy and firewall policy in this section. We then review security
challenges and design requirements that motivate the features of FlowGuard.
4.3.1 Overview of Flow Rules and Firewall Policies
Flow Policy: In an OpenFlow network, flow rules can be added into flow tables, both
reactively (generating rules in response to the packets of new flows) and proactively
(generating rules before packets arrive at the switches) [2]. In the first case, if a
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Figure 4.1: Firewall Is Bypassed by a Single Flow.
switch receives a packet for which no matching rule is found, it forwards the packet
to the controller for the further inspection. The controller will determine whether that
packet should be sent and can then install a new flow policy, which is a collection of
rules to be installed at switches 2 , for handling future packets of the same type. In
the second case, the controller or applications are allowed to initiate some rules in
the network devices before receiving flow packets.
Each flow rule specifies a pattern that matches on bits in the packet header,
actions that are performed on matching packets to describe packet forwarding, packet
modification or packet dropping, a priority that disambiguates among overlapping
patterns, and timeouts that allow a switch to delete expired rules.
Firewall Policy: A firewall policy consists of a sequence of rules that define the
actions performed on packets that satisfy certain conditions. The rules are specified
2In OpenFlow v1.0, each switch consists of one flow table. However, new versions of OpenFlow
allow every switch contains multiple flow tables.
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in the form of 〈condition, action〉. A condition in a rule is composed of a set of fields,
which is typically specified in a 5-tuple format that contains source IP, source port,
destination IP, destination port, and protocol, to identify a certain type of packets
matched by this rule. The general action in a firewall rule is either “allow” or “deny”.
In a firewall policy, multiple rules may overlap, which means one packet may match
several rules. Moreover, multiple rules within one policy may conflict, implying that
those rules, not only overlap each other but also yield different decisions. To resolve
policy conflicts, a firewall typically implements a first-match resolution mechanism
based on the order of rules. In this way, each packet processed by the firewall is
mapped to the decision of the first rule that the packet matches.
4.3.2 Security Challenges
OpenFlow offers greater flexibility to networking. At the same time, its flexibility
comes with security challenges. One such a challenge is introduced by the feature
of packet modification, since OpenFlow permits various Set-Field actions that can
dynamically change the packet headers. Adversaries could take advantage of this
feature to circumvent network security mechanisms (e.g. firewalls). Another challenge
may arise due to rule dependencies in flow tables and firewall policies. Flow rules may
overlap each other in a flow table, indicating intra-table dependency of flow rules [74].
The rules in a firewall policy may overlap as well [63, 122]. These rule dependencies
could be also leveraged by malicious OpenFlow applications and may cause severe
network breaches. Next, we articulate two hypothetical scenarios to elaborate these
challenges. To make our discussion concrete, we use an example network shown in
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 with three switches, four hosts, and one SDN controller on which
a simple firewall application (e.g. the Floodlight built-in firewall application) and
several other applications are running.
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Figure 4.2: Firewall Is Bypassed Due to Rule Dependency.
Bypass Scenario 1: Figure 4.1 shows a simple bypass scenario, which is similar to
the example given in [95]. The firewall application has a rule to deny network packets
from Host A to Host C. 3 Suppose that another application running on the controller
establishes a new flow by installing a flow policy, which contains three rules installed
in flow tables of different switches, in the network. The first rule in the flow policy
allows to simply forward packets from Host A to Host D. The second rule rewrites the
source address (SRC) of a packet to Host B and the destination address (DST) of the
packet to Host C. The last rule forwards packets from Host B to Host C. In this case,
if Host A sends a packet to Host D, the packet will be finally delivered to Host C,
which violates the firewall rule. However, if the firewall application only inspects the
flow at its ingress switch (Switch 1 ) without tracking the entire flow in the network,
such a violation cannot be observed by the firewall.
Bypass Scenario 2: A more complicated bypass scenario is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
3For brevity, we use the host name to represent the source and destination directly in the example
rules.
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The firewall application has the same policy. Assume that a policy for a flow (Flow 1 )
has been installed by an application in the network. Only the first rule in the flow
policy is different from Scenario 1. That rule matches packets from Host B to Host D
and modifies the source address of the matched packets to Host A. Since the original
source of this flow is Host B and the final destination is Host C, the flow policy
does not violate the firewall policy. Then, suppose another application installs a new
policy, which contains three forwarding rules, for a flow (Flow 2 ) in the network.
This policy is allowed by the firewall, since it directly forwards packets from Host A
to Host D and does not violate the firewall policy either. We further assume that
the policy for Flow 2 are installed in the switches with a lower priority than the
policy for Flow 1 as shown in Figure 4.2. As we can notice, two rules belonging to
different flow policies in Switch 2 overlap each other, as they both match packets with
Host A as the source address and Host D as the destination address. As a result, the
packet belonging to Flow 2 originally sent from Host A to Host D will be changed
and eventually sent to Host C. This situation causes a violation of the firewall policy.
Thus, even though individual policies defined for different flows (such as Flow 1 and
Flow 2 ) do not violate the firewall policy, the dependency relations among them may
induce violation(s).
The rule dependencies in firewall policies may also affect the presence of violations.
For example, if we add a new rule, saying “A,B → C, allow”, before the current rule
in the firewall policy. The new rule will overlap with the existing rule, because the
packets sent from Host A to Host C can match both of them. However, the first-
matched rule will take precedence in the firewall. Thus, the new rule will shadow the
existing rule [122]. As a result, no violation arises when applying such a new firewall
policy to both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2.
The built-in firewall application in Floodlight and Pyretic’s composition operators
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could not detect and resolve both bypass scenarios discussed above, since they are
unable to monitor dynamic packet modifications. FortNOX has a limitation in iden-
tifying the violation introduced in the second scenario, as the rule conflict analysis
algorithm in FortNOX ignores rule dependencies in flow tables and firewall policies.
4.3.3 Design Requirements
Our goal is to design a reliable firewall application that enables effective and
efficient detection and resolution of firewall policy violations in dynamic OpenFlow
networks. Consequently, to achieve our goal, we seek a solution that fulfills following
design requirements to balance network protection and system performance.
1. Accuracy. The firewall application should precisely detect violations caused by
traffic modifications, as well as rule dependencies in both flow tables and fire-
wall policies. Also, the identified violations should be effectively resolved with
respect to different violation situations, such as partial or entire violations. 4
2. Flexibility. The firewall application should have the capability to inspect any
network state and configuration updates, which may potentially incur firewall
policy violations. In addition, flexible resolution strategies should be provided
to deal with fine-grained violation resolutions.
3. Efficiency. The firewall application needs to continuously work in a timely
fashion. Also, the state of an OpenFlow-based network generally evolves rapidly.
Thus, it naturally requires that the response time of the firewall application
should be fast enough and its performance overhead should not affect other
network utilities.
4The detailed definitions are given in Section 18.
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4.4 FlowGuard Design
In this section, we introduce our design of FlowGuard that is based on the
proposed requirements. We focus on two main functions in FlowGuard: violation
detection and violation resolution.
4.4.1 Violation Detection
In an OpenFlow network, the header fields of flow packets could be dynamically
changed when the packets traverse the network. Thus, to support accurate violation
detection, a firewall application needs to check violations at the ingress switch of each
flow. It should also track the flow path and then clearly identify both the original
source and final destination of each flow in the network. Next, we will first introduce
flow path classifications and then articulate our violation detection method.
Flow Path Classification
A flow path is a forwarding path where one or multiple flows can pass through in
the network. A flow path, which contains a sequence of (switch, rule) pairs, can be
denoted by:
(s1, r1)→ . . . → (sn−1, rn−1)→ (sn, rn).
OpenFlow supports two kinds of flow rules, microflow rules and wildcard rules. A
microflow rule is a rule in which all header fields that a packet can exactly match.
In contrast, wildcard rules can match a large group of packets, such as all packets
with source IP address matching the prefix 1.*.*.*, which represents an IP address
range from 1.0.0.0 to 1.255.255.255. Therefore, we classify flow paths as two cate-
gories: microflow path and wildcard-flow path. In a microflow path, it contains at
least one microflow rule, but the rules in a wildcard-flow path are all wildcard rules.
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Figure 4.3: Examples of Microflow Path and Wildcard-flow Path.
A
C
B
(b) Shifted flow path
A → B
A → C
A B
A → B A → B A → B A → B A → B
A 
→
 C
(a) Direct flow path
Figure 4.4: Examples of Direct Flow Path and Shifted Flow Path.
Figure 4.3 (a) shows an example of a microflow path where only packets from Host A
to Host B can be sent. In Figure 4.3 (b), a wildcard-flow path is illustrated in such
a way that Host A and Host B can send packets to Host C and Host D.
Since the packet headers of a flow may be modified when it passes through a path
in the network, we further divide flow paths into two other categories: direct flow
path and shifted flow path. In a direct flow path, all rules only perform “forward”
action to the matched packets. In a shifted (or indirect) flow path, at least one rule
enforces Set-Field action(s) to the matched packets. Figure 4.4 shows two examples
for these paths. In the direct flow path shown in Figure 4.4 (a), Host A sends packets
to Host B without any changes. However, in the shifted path depicted in Figure 4.4
(b), the destination of packets sent by Host A is changed from Host B to Host C.
Flow Path Space Analysis
Flow Tracking: To support network-wide access control in an OpenFlow network,
a firewall application needs to figure out both the original source address and final
destination address of each flow in the network through tracking its flow path. Ac-
cordingly, we need an effective flow tracking mechanism to identify flow paths. Several
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existing network invariant verification tools [74, 76] could check network reachability
in real time and be potentially used to help find flow paths in OpenFlow networks.
We currently leverage NetPlumber [74] as a baseline for building our flow tracking
mechanism, because it offers a couple of features that can fulfill our design require-
ments: (1) Building on HSA [73], NetPlumber uses a geometric model (Header Space)
of packet processing to provide a uniform and protocol-independent model of the net-
work; (2) NetPlumber models networking boxes using a switch transfer function,
which can transform a received header to a set of packet headers arbitrarily, sup-
porting dynamic packets modifications; and (3) NetPlumber constructs a plumbing
graph, which represents all next-hop dependencies and intra-table dependencies of
rules. Through such a plumbing graph, all flow paths including both direct and
shifted flow paths in the network can be automatically captured.
In a direct flow path, when the flow packets pass through it, the packet headers
keep the same. For checking the firewall policy violations, it is not necessary to track
this kind of direct flow path and violations can be simply identified in its ingress
switch. Therefore, we introduce a concept of Shifted Flow Path Graph (SFPG), which
is a sub-graph of the plumbing graph and contains all shifted flow paths and partial
direct flow paths that have dependency relations with shifted flow paths. Therefore,
our firewall application only needs to maintain and deal with an SFPG graph when
monitoring an OpenFlow network, which could significantly reduce the overhead of
flow tracking process.
Flow Path Space Calculation: We abstract fields, which are needed for checking
firewall policy violations, from the pattern expression of a flow rule to represent the
space of corresponding flow path. In addition, we reorganize these fields with a (source
address, destination address) pair, denoted as [P s, P d], to specify a flow path space.
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In the context of IP 5-tuple sense, the source address P s consists of bit values from
three fields, source IP, source port, and protocol of the flow rule. The destination
address P d contains bit values from two fields, destination IP and destination port of
the flow rule. Then, we additionally define three kinds of spaces for representing a
flow path space:
1. Incoming Space (SPi ): It represents original header spaces of packets that can
pass through the flow path, denoted as [P si , P
d
i ].
2. Outgoing Space (SPo ): It represents final header spaces of packets after the
packets pass through the flow path, denoted as [P so , P
d
o ].
3. Tracked Space (SPt ): This space represents original source address and final
destination address of header spaces of packets that can pass through the flow
path. Thus, it is a combination of the source address of the incoming space
(P si ) and the destination address of outgoing space (P
d
o ), denoted as [P
s
i , P
d
o ].
Figure 4.5 (a) depicts the relationships of three types of flow path space. As we
can see, the incoming space of a flow path is calculated from the header spaces of
incoming packets of the flow. The outgoing space of the flow path is computed from
the header spaces of outgoing packets of the flow. Then, the tracked space of the flow
path is derived from the source address of the incoming space and the destination
address of outgoing space. An example is given in Figure 4.5 (b), which illustrates
the space representation of a wildcard shifted flow path. The incoming space of this
flow path, [(A,B), (C,D)], indicates that Host A and Host B can send packets to
Host C and Host D through this flow path, while the outgoing space of the flow path,
[(E,F ), (M,N)], presents that Host E and Host F can send packets to Host M and
Host N. That is, any packets sent from Host A and Host B through this flow path
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Figure 4.5: Flow Path Space Classification.
will be finally delivered to Host M or Host N. Thus, the tracked space of this path is
composed of the source address from its incoming space and the destination address
from its outgoing space, represented as [(A,B), (M,N)].
Firewall Authorization Space Partition
In many cases, a system administrator may intentionally introduce certain overlaps
in firewall rules knowing that only the first rule is important. In reality, this is a
commonly used technique to exclude specific parts from a certain action, and the
proper use of this technique could result in a fewer number of compact rules [122].
52
Algorithm 3: Partitioning firewall authorization space
Input: A set of rules, R.
Output: A set of allowed spaces, SFa ; A set of denied spaces, S
F
d
.
1 foreach r ∈ R do
2 sr ←− HeaderSpace(r);
3 if Action(r) = allow then
4 foreach s ∈ SF
d
do
5 /* sr is overlapping with s*/
6 sr ←− sr \ s;
7 SF
a
.Append(sr);
8 end
9 end
10 if Action(r) = deny then
11 foreach s
′
∈ SFa do
12 /* sr is overlapping with s
′
*/
13 sr ←− sr \ s
′
;
14 SF
d
.Append(sr);
15 end
16 end
17 end
18 return SF
a
, SF
d
;
Hence, for the purpose of accurately detecting firewall policy violations in OpenFlow
networks, the dependency relations between “allow” rules and “deny” rules in the
firewall policy should be decoupled.
We first introduce a concept of Firewall Authorization Space, which represents
a collection of all packets either allowed or denied by the firewall rules. Then, we
introduce an approach, which represents rules with header space and performs various
set operations on rules, to convert a list of firewall rules into two disjoint authorization
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Figure 4.6: Example of Firewall Authorization Space.
sub-spaces, denied authorization space and allowed authorization space. Algorithm 3
shows the pseudocode of partitioning authorization space for a set of firewall rules
R. This algorithm works by sequentially examining a header space sr derived from
a rule r and adding it to corresponding firewall authorization space sets, SFa or S
F
d ,
based on its type. For each r in R, if this rule is an “allow” rule, the header space
sr derived from this rule is compared with existing header spaces in the denied space
set SFd . If the header space sr is covered by any existing header spaces in S
F
d , the
covered space(s) is removed from sr and then the modified sr is added into S
F
a . The
similar process is applied to a “deny” rule. Therefore, one can utilize set operations to
separate the overlapped spaces of a firewall policy into two disjoint authorization space
sets SFa : {s
F
a1
, ..., sFan−1 , s
F
an
} and SFd : {s
F
d1
, ..., sFdm−1 , s
F
dm
}. Formally, sFai ∩ s
F
dj
= ∅,
where sFai ∈ S
F
a , s
F
dj
∈ SFd , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Note that it is unnecessary
to eliminate overlapping header spaces within SFa and S
F
d , since those overlapping
header spaces could not affect the results of violation detection and keeping them can
potentially reduce the number of header spaces in each authorization space set.
An example of firewall authorization space partition is shown in Figure 4.6. For
the purposes of brevity and understandability, we employ a two-dimensional geo-
metric representation for each header space derived from firewall rules. Note that a
firewall rule typically utilizes five fields to define the rule condition, thus a complete
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representation of header space should be multi-dimensional. In Figure 4.6 (b), we
utilize colored rectangles to denote two kinds of authorization spaces: allowed space
(white color) and denied space (pink color), respectively. In this example, there are
an allowed space representing the first rule and a denied space depicting the second
rule. Two spaces overlap when there are packets matching both rules (Figure 4.6 (b)).
Applying Algorithm 3 to the example policy (Figure 4.6 (a)), the header space of the
first rule is added into the allowed authorization space set. Then, the overlapped
space is removed from the header space of the second rule, and the modified header
space is added to the denied authorization space set.
Violation Discovery
Once the space of a flow path and the firewall authorization space of the firewall
policy are calculated, we identify violations through checking the tracked space (SPt )
of a flow path, which allows a flow to pass through the network, against the denied
authorization space (SF
′
d ) that is a union of all header spaces in the denied authoriza-
tion space set (SFd ) of the firewall policy. If these two spaces overlap each other, we
call the overlapping space as the violated space (Sv = S
P
t ∩ S
F ′
d , denoted by [P
s
v , P
d
v ],
where s and d denote source and destination addresses, respectively), which indicates
a firewall policy violation. There are two kinds of violations.
• Entire Violation: If the denied authorization space SF
′
d includes the whole
tracked space SPt of the flow path, the violated space Sv indicates an entire
violation. Formally, SPt ⊆ S
F ′
d .
• Partial Violation: If the denied authorization space SF
′
d partially includes the
tracked space SPt of the flow path, the violated space Sv points out a partial
violation. Formally, SPt * S
F ′
d and S
P
t ∩ S
F ′
d 6= ∅.
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Figure 4.7: Violation Detection.
Figure 4.7 shows an example of our violation detection approach. The tracked
space depicts that the original source of the flow is Host A and Host B, and the
final destination of the flow is Host M and Host N. The firewall authorization space
illustrates that all packets from Host A and Host C to Host M and Host N are denied.
Thus, the violated space, which is depicted in inclined stripes in Figure 4.7, contains
a partial tracked flow space represented with the original source of Host A and the
final destinations of Host M and Host N. That is, all packets originally sent from Host
A and finally arrived at Host M or Host N should be denied by the firewall.
4.4.2 Violation Resolution
An intuitive means for resolving a firewall policy violation is to simply disable
the violated flow policy. That is, for a new flow policy, the request for installing this
policy is rejected, if the firewall application detects this policy is in violation of the
firewall policy. Regarding existing flow policies that violate the firewall policy, they
are removed from the network devices directly. However, such a solution have several
drawbacks. First, a flow policy may only partially violate the firewall policy as we
discussed in Section 18. In this case, rejecting/removing the flow policy may affect
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Figure 4.8: FlowGuard Violation Resolution Framework.
the utility of network services. Second, a rule in a flow policy may have dependency
relations with the rules of other flow policies. Deleting a rule in a violated policy may
impact other flow policies and even create new violation(s). Obviously, it is necessary
to seek a systematic solution to enable a flexible and effective violation resolution.
To this end, we introduce a violation resolution framework, as depicted in Figure 4.8,
which demonstrates how FlowGuard adopts four violation resolution strategies to
resolve different firewall policy violations in terms of various update operations on
both flow policies and firewall policies in OpenFlow networks. We next discuss such
a framework based on those resolution strategies.
Dependency Breaking
Situation: A new flow policy is being added into the network switches and this single
flow policy does not violate the firewall policy. However, the rules in this new flow
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policy overlap with the rules of other flow policies when it is installed in the switches
following the routing path calculated by the controller. Such a situation causes rule
dependencies among flow policies. In addition, like the Scenario 2 demonstrated in
Section 4.3.2, these rule dependencies cause new firewall policy violation(s). This
kind of violation can also be incurred by other changes of network states, such as
modifying flow entries and updating firewall rules.
Solution: Since rule dependencies among different flow policies could cause unex-
pected changes in packet headers of flows and also lead to new firewall policy viola-
tions, an approach for these issues is to break the dependencies among flow policies.
Then, we can guarantee that when the packets of a flow traverse the network, they
are precisely processed by the policy defining such a flow.
Inspired by the approach discussed in [101], which utilizes tags to distinguish
packets belonging to different versions of policies for ensuring consistent network
updates, we can use tags to break the rule dependencies as well. In this mechanism,
the new flow policy is preprocessed by adding a tag to differentiate the match pattern
with other policies. The rule of the policy in the ingress switch will take additional
action on the packets to stamp them with the same tag. As the packets leave the
network, in the egress switch, the corresponding rule of the policy will strip the tag
from the packets.
Update Rejecting
Situation: There are three possible cases that can apply this strategy: (1) when
adding a new flow policy, corresponding flow path is detected as a violation of the
firewall policy and the violation is an entire violation; (2) changing a rule induces
new entire violation(s); and (3) deleting a rule causes new entire violation(s), since
some rules of other flows have dependency relations with this rule.
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Figure 4.9: Violation Resolution Through Packet Blocking.
Solution: Applying this strategy, the update operation is rejected directly. Note
that, this strategy may not be always applied for cases (2) and (3), since a change
or delete operation on a rule may be mandatory depending on the privileges of the
operator. 5
Flow Removing
Situation: Two cases can apply this strategy: (1) when updating (adding, changing,
or deleting) a rule(s) in the firewall policy, the firewall application examines the
current network state applying the updated rule(s) and detect new entire violation(s);
and (2) a change or delete operation on a rule is allowed, even though it causes entire
violation(s).
Solution: Using this strategy, all rules associated with a flow path, which entirely
violates the firewall policy, are removed from the network switches.
5A permission system for OpenFlow controller like the proposal discussed in [121] is required for
deciding the operator’s privileges.
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Table 4.1: Detection and Resolution Elapsed Time in ms for Different Resolution
Strategies.
Resolution Method
Example Topology Stanford w/o rules Stanford w/ rules
Detection Resolution Detection Resolution Detection Resolution
Dependency Break 2.12 10.11 5.84 10.24 6.93 11.39
Update Rejecting 2.73 1.42 5.13 1.50 7.09 4.83
Flow Removing 2.62 2.61 5.86 2.80 7.85 16.27
Packet Blocking 2.36 5.34 5.74 5.21 6.34 5.25
Packet Blocking
Situation: For any partial violation detected by the firewall application, this strategy
can be applied.
Solution: There may exist two ways to block packets of a flow: (1) if the flow is a
new flow, the firewall application only needs to block it in the ingress switch of the
flow; and (2) if the flow is an old flow, the firewall application needs to block the
packets in both ingress and egress switches. In such a case, blocking packets in the
ingress switch can prevent any new packets of the violated flow entering the network,
while blocking packets in the egress switch can prevent any inflight packets of the
violated flow from going through the network.
In order to block packets, the firewall application needs to install new blocking
rules in the ingress and/or egress switches. As shown in Figure 4.9, the blocking
rules can be derived from the violated space (Sv: [P
s
v , P
d
v ]). The header space of
the blocking rule for the ingress switch is a combination of the source address of the
violated space (Sv) and the destination address of the incoming space (S
P
i ), denoted
as [P sv , P
d
i ]. The header space of the blocking rule for the egress switch is combined
from the source address of the outgoing space (SPo ) and the destination address of
the violated space (Sv), denoted as [P
s
o , P
d
v ].
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4.4.3 Optimization Considerations
Since an OpenFlow firewall application must perform the violation detection and
resolution in real time, several optimization mechanisms should be considered.
Incremental Checking: Building on NetPlumber, the flow track mechanism in
FlowGuard is capable of performing incremental checks when updating flow policy.
In addition, FlowGuard enables incremental checks for the firewall policy as well.
Instead of recomputing an entire firewall authorization space each time whenever the
firewall policy changes, FlowGuard only incrementally calculates the header spaces
that are affected by these changes.
Maintaining Partial Flow Graph: As we have discussed in Section 4.4.1, Flow-
Guard only needs to maintain an SFPG graph that is a sub-graph of the plumbing
graph. In addition, FlowGuard can check the source address in the incoming space
of each shifted flow path against the source address of head spaces in its denied space.
If these two source addresses do not overlap each other, FlowGuard can guarantee
that the shifted flow path will not violate its policy without tracking the flow path.
Thus, that shifted flow path can be removed from the SFPG graph.
4.5 Implementation and Evaluation
We have implemented our FlowGuard application on top of Floodlight. Flow-
Guard adopts NetPlumber data structure [13] for building header objects and com-
puting intra-table dependencies. Thus, FlowGuard adds several new classes, such
as HeaderObject and RuleNode, to implement bit-level representation of packet head-
ers and rule dependency checking features. In addition, FlowGuard adds listeners
to monitor two modules, Static Flow Pusher and Memory Storage Source, supported
by Floodlight controller to retrieve network topology information and flow rules in
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real time. FlowGuard retrieves flow rules using the Static Flow Pusher module
to build/modify RuleNodes, so that FlowGuard sorts them by their priorities and
computes intra-table dependencies. At the same time, FlowGuard obtains the in-
formation of network devices including attached switch ID and corresponding port
number using the Memory Storage Source module, and utilizes it to understand the
physical topology of a network.
FlowGuard combines topology information with flow rules installed in the net-
work to build the flow graph for tracking flow paths. If the tracked spaces of flow
paths overlap with firewall denied authorization space, FlowGuard analyzes the
root cause of each violation and leverages a corresponding resolution strategy to
resolve the identified violation as illustrated in Figure 4.8. At the same time, Flow-
Guard maintains updated flow rules and network topology information, so that it is
able to re-propagate header objects at any associated switches to update flow paths.
In addition, FlowGuard utilizes the Floodlight built-in firewall to generate new
blocking rules and the Static Flow Pusher module to add/modify/delete flow rules
for violation resolution with respect to different violation resolution strategies.
4.5.1 Experiment Design
All of our experiments were performed in Ubuntu 12.04 virtual machines, each of
which has four processors and 8GB memory. We ran Mininet 2.0 [22] in one virtual
machine to simulate the network topologies and used another virtual machine to run
FlowGuard on top of Floodlight v0.90.
The experiments were carried out on two network topologies, one of which is the
network demonstrated in Section 4.3.2. We instantiated the IP addresses of Host A
to Host D from 10.0.0.1 to 10.0.0.4. The other topology is constructed based on the
Stanford backbone network [74] that includes 14 operational zone Cisco routers, 10
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Ethernet switches, and 2 backbone Cisco routers. By using this real-world network,
we attempted to demonstrate the scalability of FlowGuard. The entire configu-
ration of the Stanford backbone network was retrieved from [13]. We developed two
parsers to convert the file formats in Stanford dataset to Floodlight’s languages. The
first parser reads Cisco routing table information and outputs Floodlight-acceptable
flow table information. Overall, there are 8, 908 flow entries in the network. The
second parser accepts Cisco access control list (ACL) files as input and generates
corresponding firewall rules for FlowGuard. There are the total of 1, 206 realistic
firewall rules used in the network.
4.5.2 FlowGuard Violation Detection and Resolution
Dependency Breaking: To test the effectiveness of our dependency breaking strat-
egy, we used the same topology as shown in Bypass Scenario 2. The flow tables
of Switches 1, 2, and 3 before applying the resolution technique are shown in Fig-
ure 4.11 (a), (c), and (e). There was only one firewall rule specified in FlowGuard,
which denied the communications from 10.0.0.1 to 10.0.0.3. As we discussed in Sec-
tion 4.4, Flow 1 and Flow 2 in Figure 4.2 does not violate the firewall rule directly.
However, the intra-table dependency occurred in Switch 2 introduces a potential fire-
wall rule violation. In order to resolve this issue, FlowGuard removed the intra-
table dependency by isolating Flow 1 from Flow 2 using a virtual LAN (VLAN)
field. As depicted in Figures 4.11 (b), (d), and (f), the flow tables were updated by
FlowGuard respectively. The action field of the first flow entry in Switch 1 has
been updated to add a VLAN ID 100, and the corresponding flow entry in Switch 2
was modified to match the same VLAN ID. And finally Switch 3, which is the egress
switch in this case, removed the VLAN ID to restore the original packet.
We carried out the same experiment again in the Stanford backbone network. As
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(a) Switch 1 Flow Table before Resolution
(b) Switch 1 Flow Table after Resolution
(c) Switch 2 Flow Table before Resolution
(d) Switch 2 Flow Table after Resolution
(e) Switch 3 Flow Table before Resolution
(f) Switch 3 Flow Table after Resolution
Figure 4.10: Flow Tables Before/After FlowGuard’s Packet Blocking Strategy.
Every Subfigure Is a Screen Shot Taken from the Floodlight Controller GUI.
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(a) Switch 1 Flow Table before Resolution
(b) Switch 1 Flow Table after Resolution
(c) Switch 2 Flow Table before Resolution
(d) Switch 2 Flow Table after Resolution
(e) Switch 3 Flow Table before Resolution
(f) Switch 3 Flow Table after Resolution
Figure 4.11: Flow Tables Before/After FlowGuard’s Dependency Breaking Strat-
egy. Every Subfigure Is a Screenshot Taken from the Floodlight Controller GUI.
65
shown in Table 4.1, the detection and resolution time with the example topology
were 2.12 and 10.11 milliseconds (ms), respectively. And the resolution time with
the Stanford topology was almost unchanged but the detection time has been slightly
increased.
Update Rejecting: We used the scenario shown in Bypass Scenario 1 to test this
strategy. We first installed the flow entries in Switch 1 and Switch 3 as shown in Fig-
ure 4.1. As the green boxes in Figure 4.13 indicate, the installations were successful.
Then we tried to add the flow entry shown in Flow Table 2 in Figure 4.1 to Switch 2.
As the red box showing in Figure 4.13, FlowGuard decided to reject this flow ta-
ble update request since it brought a firewall rule violation. As shown in Table 4.1,
FlowGuard spent 2.73 ms to detect this violation and 1.42 ms for resolution with
example topology. For the Stanford network with flow entries, FlowGuard took
7.09ms for detection but only spent 4.83ms for resolution since FlowGuard simply
rejected to insert new rule.
Flow Removing: We utilized Bypass Scenario 1 again to evaluate this strategy. We
first set up all the flow entries shown in Figure 4.1 without running FlowGuard.
As expected, the built-in Floodlight firewall could not identify any violation. Then,
we enabled FlowGuard and specified the firewall rule as shown in Figure 4.1. As a
result, FlowGuard detected the violation and removed corresponding flow entries
that caused this violation in the three switches. As Table 4.1 shows, the detection
took 2.62 ∼ 7.85 ms (slightly increasing) but the Stanford topology with flow entries
took 16.27 ms to resolve the violation since FlowGuard inspected all flow entries
to find out any missing flow entries which are associated with the removed flow.
Packet Blocking: To set up a partial violation, we first installed a flow policy as
shown in Figure 4.10. The flow entry in Switch 1 forwards every packet whose source
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Figure 4.13: Screen Shot for Update Rejecting Strategy.
IP is in 10.0.0.0/24 and destination IP is in 10.0.0.0/24. The flow entry in Switch 2
modifies source IP to 10.0.0.6/32 when the incoming packet has source IP 10.0.0.1/32
and destination IP in 10.0.0.0/24. The flow entry in Switch 3 rewrites destination
IP to 10.0.0.4/32 whenever the source IP is in 10.0.0.0/24 and the destination IP is
10.0.0.5/32. Then, we enabled FlowGuard and installed a firewall rule that blocks
packets from 10.0.0.1 to 10.0.0.4. Since the installed flow policy would allow the
connection between 10.0.0.1 to 10.0.0.4, the firewall rule is violated. FlowGuard
detected such a partial violation, generated two additional flow entries, and installed
them in the ingress switch and egress switch, respectively.
As shown in Figure 4.10 (b), FlowGuard installed a new flow entry in Switch 1
that blocked packets with source IP 10.0.0.1/32 and destination IP 10.0.0.5/32. Since
the flow entry in Switch 2 rewrote the source IP of packets from 10.0.0.1/32 to
10.0.0.6/32, FlowGuard also installed a new flow entry in Switch 3 that dropped
packets with source IP 10.0.0.6/32 and destination IP 10.0.0.5/32. In addition,
FlowGuard installed a new firewall rule that denied the packets from 10.0.0.1
to 10.0.0.5. As Table 4.1 shows, the overhead of detection is similar to the other
strategies, and it took 5.21 ∼ 5.34 ms for resolution.
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4.5.3 Scalability Analysis of FlowGuard
Although we have performed our evaluation under two different topologies, we
still want to examine the scalability of FlowGuard with respect to different sizes
of flow rules. Therefore, we increased the number of flow rules based on the Stanford
network topology to evaluate the scalability of FlowGuard. We checked detection
and resolution time changes under two different scenarios. In the first scenario, by
inserting 100 ∼ 500 additional flow rules in each switch, the Stanford network have
11k ∼ 22k rules in total since it contains 26 switches. In the second scenario, we
only increased the number of flow rules at the switches associated with the violated
flow paths by adding 500 ∼ 2, 500 flow rules at each relevant switch. As shown in
Figure 4.12 (a) and Figure 4.12 (b), the violation detection time was increased linearly
in accordance with the growing numbers of flow rules. The resolution time changes
in the second scenario, depicted in Figures 4.12 (d), tell us that the dependency
breaking strategy is the most heavy resolution mechanism among four resolution
strategies. However, as shown in Figures 4.12 (c), FlowGuard spent less than 25
ms to resolve each violation in networks with large sizes of flow rules.
4.5.4 Performance Comparison with Floodlight Built-in Firewall
We also compared the performance of FlowGuard (FG) with the performance of
the Floodlight built-in firewall (FW). We first measured the time FG and FW spent
to initialize themselves in different network configurations. For an empty network
where there is no network node, FG took 0.88 ms to finish initialization, while FW
took 0.87 ms. For the Stanford network without any flow entries, FG took 3.21 ms,
while FW spent 1.02 ms. For the Stanford network with all forwarding entries and
ACL rules installed, FG spent 740.08 ms, while FW took 0.97 ms. This is because
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Figure 4.14: Firewall Rule Update Time in Microsecond.
FG needs to analyze many flow entries as well as firewall rules. As we can observe,
even with a real world network, the initialization of FlowGuard is fast (less than
one second).
We are also interested in how long it takes for FG and FW to update new firewall
rules. To test this, we updated FG and FW with around 700 rules for each of which we
recorded the time FG and FW used for processing. We draw an empirical cumulative
distribution function (CDF) graph based on the results as shown in Figure 4.14. As
the figure suggests, FG has almost the same update time as FW does, under the same
network conditions. Most rules could be updated in less than 63 microseconds in the
Stanford topology.
We also generated around 5K testing packets to measure per-packet inspection
time for FG and FW. We used the Stanford topology with all ACL rules installed.
As shown in Figure 4.15, the inspection time of 90% packets with flow entries was
slower than 0.074 milliseconds, while without flow entries FG and FW spent less than
0.051 milliseconds to inspect 90% packets. As the results suggest, even though it took
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Figure 4.15: Per Packet Inspection Time in Microsecond.
longer for FG to inspect packets than FW, the processing speed was still very fast.
4.6 Discussion and Future Work
Security Enforcement Kernel: The design goal of FortNOX is to provide a se-
curity enforcement kernel (SEK) that can be integrated into OpenFlow controllers.
Then, other OpenFlow-based security applications can rely on such an SEK to detect
and resolve rule conflicts that may be introduced by non-security applications. Fort-
NOX has been utilized to support FRESCO [109], an OpenFlow security application
development framework. However, as we have discussed above, FortNOX has several
limitations in rule conflict detection and resolution. In contrast, FlowGuard pro-
vides a new design that facilitates not only accurate conflict detection but also flexible
and effective conflict resolution. Thus, we believe the solution provided by Flow-
Guard could be potentially utilized for building a more robust SEK for OpenFlow
controllers.
Stateful Monitoring: Currently, OpenFlow only provides very limited access to
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packet-level information in the controller [112]. In addition, the OpenFlow forward-
ing plane is almost stateless and incapable to actively monitor flow status without
the involvement of the controller [113]. Therefore, as our first step for designing
an OpenFlow-based firewall application, we only implemented FlowGuard as a
stateless firewall application, which could not perform stateful packet inspection in
OpenFlow networks. However, we would explore how FlowGuard can be extended
to support stateful packet inspection.
Flow Tracking: The flow tracking mechanism used in FlowGuard builds on Net-
Plumber, which has limitations for dealing with middleboxes with dynamic state [74].
FlowTags [54] was recently proposed to handle dynamic traffic modification in the
presence of legacy middleboxes. However, FlowTags needs to extend current Open-
Flow architecture to support flow tracking features. As our further work, we would
like to study a more effective flow tracking solution for FlowGuard implementation.
Network Programming Language: The current design of FlowGuard is built
on top of OpenFlow, which is defined at a low level of network abstraction. The Fre-
netic Project [57] introduces a family of languages providing reusable and high level
abstractions for programming SDNs. In particular, Pyretic [89], which is one member
of the Frenetic family, enables a program to combine multiple policies together using
policy composition operators, potentially resolving partial policy conflicts including
direct firewall policy violations. However, lacking a policy conflict detection mecha-
nism in Pyretic, it is obviously inefficient to always compose the firewall policy with
flow policies and install them into the network switches due to several reasons. First,
a firewall policy may consist of over thousands of rules, but commodity SDN switches
with limited TCAM space typically support only a few thousands of rules [117]. Sec-
ond, if flow policies entirely violates the firewall policy, it is unnecessary to install
those violated flow policies into the network switches. Therefore, we would study
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solutions that facilitate more secure and effective policy compositions in high level
abstractions for building security applications in SDNs.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented the design and implementation of a new
OpenFlow-based firewall application, FlowGuard, for software-defined networks.
FlowGuard provides an effective approach to detect firewall policy violations through
examining the flow path space against the firewall authorization space. In addition,
FlowGuard supports a flexible and fine-grained conflict resolution with respect to
different update scenarios in flow entries and firewall rules. Our experimental re-
sults show that FlowGuard has the manageable performance overhead to enable
real-time monitoring of software-defined networks.
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Chapter 5
STATEMON: ENABLE STATEFUL NETWORK POLICY MANAGEMENT
5.1 Introduction
Over the past few years, Software-Defined Networks (SDNs) have evolved from
purely an idea [47, 46, 60] to a new paradigm that several networking vendors are not
only embracing, but also pursuing as their model for future enterprise network man-
agement. According to a recent report from Google, SDN-based network management
helped them run their WAN at close to 100% utilization compared to other state-of-
the-art network environments with about 30% to 40% network utilization [70].
As the first widely adopted standard for SDNs, OpenFlow [86] essentially separates
the control plane and the data plane of a network device and enables the network
control to become directly programmable as well as the underlying infrastructure
to be abstracted for network applications. With OpenFlow, only the data plane
exists in the network device, and all control decisions are conveyed to the device
through a logically-centralized controller. In this way, OpenFlow can tremendously
help administrators access and update configurations of network devices in a timely
and convenient manner and provide this ease of control to SDN applications as well.
While the abstraction of a logically centralized controller, which is a core principle
of SDNs is powerful, a fundamental limitation of OpenFlow is the lack of capability
to enable the maintenance of network connection states inside both the controller and
switches. First, OpenFlow-enabled switches only forward the first packet of a new
flow to the controller so that the controller can make a centralized routing decision.
Because the controller is unaware of subsequent packets of the flow, including those
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that change the state of a network connection (e.g., TCP FIN), the controller has no
knowledge of the state of the connections in its network. Second, OpenFlow-enabled
switches are incapable of monitoring network connection states as well. The “match-
action” abstraction of OpenFlow heavily relies on L2/L3 fields (e.g., src ip and dst ip)
and the limited L4 fields (only src port and dst port), yet essential information for
identifying and maintaining the state of connections is contained in other L4 fields,
such as TCP flags and TCP sequence and acknowledgment numbers.
The lack of knowledge of network connection states in SDNs brings significant chal-
lenges in building state-aware access control management schemes [90]. In particular,
some critical security services, such as stateful network firewalls that perform network-
wide access control, cannot be realized in SDNs. A stateful network firewall, which is
a key network access control service in a traditional network environment [59, 64, 102]
and requires state-awareness, keeps track of the states of connections in the network
and makes a decision for its access (e.g., ALLOW or DENY) according to the states
of connections in networks. However, it is impossibly hard to realize them in current
SDNs due to the inherent limitations of OpenFlow.
Some recent research efforts [88, 90, 54, 120, 41, 8, 40, 124] extended the OpenFlow
data plane abstraction to support stateful network applications. They attempted to
let individual switches, rather than the controller, track the state of connections. We
believe that, not only does this design go against the spirit of SDN (because it brings
the control plane back to switches and makes switches manipulate connection states
and performs complex actions beyond a simple forwarding operation), these existing
approaches are only applicable for designing applications that need only local states
on a single switch [40]. However, such solutions force SDN applications individually
access every single switch to collect entire network states, consequently network-wide
monitoring to detect abnormalities and enforcing network-wide access control of flows
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become extremely difficult.
To overcome the limitations of existing approaches, we argue that utilizing the
SDN controller for global tracking connections is more advantageous than existing
solutions in terms of its state visibility across SDN applications that is crucial to some
security applications such as a stateful network firewall. To bring such a state-aware
network access management in SDNs, we propose a novel state tracking framework
called StateMon. StateMon models active connections in SDNs and monitors
global connection states in the controller with the help of both a global state table
that records the current state of each active connection and a state management
table that governs the state transition of new and existing connections. StateMon
also introduces a lightweight extension to OpenFlow, called OpenConnection, that
programs the data plane to forward the state-changing packets to the controller.
At the same time, it retains the simple “match-action” programmable feature of
OpenFlow and avoids scalability problems over the communication channel between
the controller and switches. In essence, StateMon follows the general SDN principle
of logical-to-physical decoupling and avoids embedding complicated control logic in
the physical devices, therefore, keeping the SDN data plane as simple as possible.
In addition, to demonstrate the practicality and feasibility of StateMon and
state-aware network access management applications in SDNs, we design a stateful
network firewall based on the APIs provided by StateMon. Our firewall application
provides more in-depth access control than a stateless SDN firewall [67]. It detects
and resolves connection disruptions and unauthorized access attempts targeting active
connections in SDNs. To demonstrate the generality of StateMon, we reimplement
a prior work (port knocking) based on StateMon (Section 5.5.2). Our experimental
results show that StateMon and network access management applications (stateful
firewall and port knocking) introduce manageable performance overhead to manage
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network access control.
Contributions: The contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a connection tracking framework called StateMon that enables
SDN to support state-aware access control schemes by leveraging global network
states. StateMon keeps the data plane as simple as possible, thus being
compliant with the spirit of SDN’s design principle.
• We propose the OpenConnection protocol, which is a lightweight extension
to OpenFlow and retains the simple “match-action” programmable feature of
OpenFlow to enable a stateful SDN data plane.
• We implement a prototype of StateMon using Floodlight [11] and Open
vSwitch. Our experiments demonstrate that StateMon introduces a minimal
increase of communication messages with manageable performance overhead
(3.27% throughput degradation).
• We design a stateful network firewall application, using the APIs provided by
StateMon. Our experiments show that the stateful firewall provides more con-
trol than existing stateless firewalls and it can effectively detect and mitigate
certain connection-related attacks (e.g., connection disruptions and unautho-
rized access) in SDNs.
This chapter is organized as follows. We overview the motivating problems in
Section 6.2. Section 6.3 presents the design of state-aware StateMon. Section 5.4
describes the design of stateful network firewall supported by StateMon, and the
implementation and evaluation details are in Section 5.5. Section 6.8 discusses the
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Figure 5.1: Standard OpenFlow Operation and Its Stateless Property.
related work of this chapter, and Section 6.9 describes several important issues. In
Section 6.10, we conclude this chapter.
5.2 Background and Problem Statement
To understand our proposed solution to adding state-awareness to SDNs, we pro-
vide an overview of the current OpenFlow operation. When an OpenFlow-enabled
switch receives a packet, it first checks its flow tables to find matching rules. If no such
rules exist, this means it is the first packet of a new flow. The switch then forwards
the packet to the controller, and it is the controller’s job to decide how to handle
the flow and to install flow table rules in the appropriate switches. Specifically, the
packet is encapsulated in an OFPT PACKET IN message sent to the controller, and the
controller then installs corresponding rules called flow entries into the switches along
the controller’s intended path for the flow. Once these flow entries are installed, all
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Table 5.1: Existing Stateful Inspection and Management Methodologies for SDNs.
(D = Data Plane, C = Control Plane, A = Application Plane)
Solution
Inspection Storage
Implementation
D C A D C A
App-aware [88] X X firewall, load-balancer
UMON [120] X X software switch
Conntrack [8] X X software switch
OpenState [40] X X software switch
FAST [90] X X firewall
SDPA [124] X X firewall, hardware switch
FlowTags [54, 55] X X X proxy cache
OpenNF [58] X X X intrusion detection system, network monitor
P4 [41] X X X (no implementation)
StateMon X X X -
subsequent packets of this flow are automatically forwarded by the switches, without
sending the packet to the controller.
For example, in Figure 5.1, host A wants to initiate a TCP connection with web
server B. The first packet (TCP SYN) sent by host A is checked by the ingress
switch S1 and forwarded to the controller because S1 has no flow table entry for the
packet. The controller allows the flow from host A to server B by installing flow
entries fe1, fe2, and fe3, into switches S1, S2, and S3, respectively. The flow from
host A to server B is called a forward flow. Using the same process, the response
packet (TCP SYNACK) generated by server B will trigger the controller to install
fe4, fe5, and fe6 into S3, S2, and S1, respectively. The flow from server B to host A
is called a reverse flow.
As can be seen from Figure 5.1, neither the OpenFlow-enabled switch nor the
controller has the ability to track and maintain connection states, which makes it im-
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possible to directly develop stateful access control based on OpenFlow in SDNs. As a
result, existing SDN controllers (e.g., Floodlight) only have a stateless firewall appli-
cation that enforces ACL (Access Control List) rules to monitor all OFPT PACKET IN
behaviors.
Using Figure 5.1 as an example, these stateless firewall applications can only
specify simple rules, such as “packets from server B to host A are allowed.” In contrast,
a stateful firewall is a critical component in traditional systems and networks which
provides more control over whether a packet is allowed or denied based on connection
state information. For example, a stateful firewall rule could specify “packets from
server B to host A are allowed, if and only if host A initiates the connection to
server B.” These stateful rules are incredibly useful for security purposes, for instance
to specify that a web server should be able to accept incoming connections but never
initiate an outgoing connection. However, despite the great security benefit of these
stateful policies, it is challenging to build a stateful firewall in SDNs without the full
support of stateful packet inspection [67], which is critical to provide effective network
access control management.
In addition to the development of a stateful firewall application, the knowledge
of connection states in SDNs can also help maintain the network’s availability. The
SDN controller and applications can install, update, or delete flow entries for their own
purposes. However, these actions may interrupt established connections, which may
consequently damage the availability of services in the network. Consider the case of
a load balancer application, which switches flows between two web servers (Servers
B and C in Figure 5.1). If the flows are changed while a network connection is still
in progress, the availability of the service would be affected. Also, attackers, who are
able to perform a man-in-the-middle attack on OpenFlow-enabled switches [39], can
also disrupt existing connections in the network by intentionally updating flow entries.
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The root cause of these issues is that the controller and the SDN applications have
no knowledge of the connection states, which results in creating potential chances of
unauthorized access into existing connections by attackers. We argue that a critical
functionality of OpenFlow or any other SDN implementation is that the controller
should be able to identify the conflicts between active connections and any pending
flow entry update and provide network administrators with an early warning before
a conflicting flow entry takes effect. Existing verification tools [74, 73, 75, 85] cannot
detect and address such conflicts, because they are unaware of connection states in
the network. By tracking global connection states in the network, the controller will
be able to deal with such conflicts and help maintain the availability of the services
in the network.
We summarize existing solutions in Table 5.1 that are mostly applicable only for
designing applications that need states locally. App-aware approach [88] adds cus-
tomized OpenFlow table in the data plane to be able to check packets and redirect
them to different network applications such as a firewall and a load balancer. However,
this application-aware table is statically defined at the compile time and maintains
network states locally. Consequently, network states are to be distributed whereas
StateMon centrally collects all network state and records them in SDN controller.
UMON [120] and Conntrack [8] put customized tables in the middle of OpenFlow
pipelines in the data plane to perform anomaly detection and stateful packet inspec-
tion, respectively. OpenState [40] performs state checking using the state table in
conjunction with an extended finite state machine that is directly programmable by
the controller. FAST [90] compiles the state machine of a specific network proto-
col such as TCP in the control plane and installs corresponding state-based tables
(state transition table and action table) into SDN switches. SDPA [124] inserts the
forwarding processor into OpenFlow-based processing pipeline to enable stateful for-
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warding scheme including hardware-based design. FlowTags [54, 55] attaches tag
information at the end of TCP header of in-flight packets to record middleboxes’
state-based information rather than checking state using SDN switches or the con-
troller. However, none of these approaches is able to maintain global network states
centrally and helps SDN applications access the information, allowing them to im-
plement their business logic based on global network states. Only OpenNF [58] and
P4 [41] attempt to utilize the control plane of SDNs for state checking and consoli-
dating network states. OpenNF focuses on collecting states of network middleboxes
(e.g., IDS, Net-Monitor) to support dynamic middlebox migration, and P4 is a pro-
posal for next generation of OpenFlow to support state inspections. However, the
former is not applicable for collecting generic network states (e.g., connection state),
and the latter does not include a workable implementation. Thus, we argue that a
global connection monitoring framework, which can be aggregated by the controller,
is imperative for network-wide connection monitoring and access management. Such
a global connection awareness not only enables stateful firewall applications to detect
indirect policy violations considering dynamic packet modification in SDNs, but also
helps identify connection disruptions and unauthorized access occurred in existing
connections.
5.3 StateMon Design
In this section, we first present the key design goals of our StateMon framework.
Then, we illustrate the overall architecture and working modules of StateMon and
further show how they meet our design goals.
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5.3.1 Design Goals
To enable stateful access management applications and overcome the limitations
of existing approaches, we propose a novel state-aware connection tracking framework
called StateMon to support building stateful network firewall for SDNs. StateMon
is designed with the following goals in mind:
• Centralization: StateMon should, in adhering to the principles of SDN,
manage a global view of all network connection states in a centralized manner
at the control plane.
• Generalization: StateMon should support any state-based protocols and
provide state information to SDN applications.
• High Scalability: StateMon should minimize message exchanges between
the controller and switches so that the control channel will not be the perfor-
mance bottleneck when monitoring all network connection states.
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Figure 5.2: StateMon Architecture Overview
5.3.2 StateMon Architecture Overview
Figure 5.2 shows an overview of the StateMon architecture, which adds new
modules in both the control plane (controller) and the data plane (switches) of the
OpenFlow system architecture.
To achieve the centralization goal, StateMon modules in switches use only the
match-action abstraction to perform packet lookups, forwarding, and other actions
based on the OpenConnection table (Section 5.3.3), whereas modules in the con-
troller track a global view of states (Section 5.3.4). A controller uses the OpenCon-
nection protocol to program OpenConnection tables, which are added to the Open-
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Flow processing pipeline by introducing a “Goto OpenConnection Table” instruction
(Goto-OCT) in OpenFlow action set.
To achieve the generality goal, StateMon maintains a pair of global state table
and state management table for each state-aware application. A state-aware applica-
tion initializes those tables and registers callback functions using the APIs provided
by StateMon. The global state table records network-wide connection state infor-
mation. Each entry in this table represents an active connection by specifying the
flow entries that govern the active connection (e.g., fe1, · · · , fe6 in Figure 5.1) and its
connection state (e.g., ESTABLISHED in TCP). The state management table keeps
state transition rules and actions that should be performed on each state (e.g., send
an OpenConnection message to the controller).
StateMon uses three methods to minimize the communication overhead between
the controller and switches to meet the high scalability design goal. First, State-
Mon leverages existing OpenFlow protocols such as OFPT PACKET IN message for
monitoring connection states. For example, the first packet of a new flow delivered
by OFPT PACKET IN message would not trigger a separate OpenConnection message.
Second, StateMon identifies ingress and egress switches for each connection and only
installs necessary OpenConnection entries into those switches to perform a state-based
inspection. Thus, StateMon minimizes the increase of additional table entries and
avoids the potential overhead that can be generated by other intermediate switches
on the path. Third, the OpenConnection protocol sends only expected state-changing
packets from switches to the controller.
5.3.3 OpenConnection Protocol
On receipt of a packet, an OpenConnection-enabled switch starts with the OpenFlow-
based packet process. For any new flow, the first packet of this flow is forwarded to the
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Figure 5.3: Structure of an Entry in an OpenConnection Table.
controller via an OFPT PACKET IN message. Then, the controller determines whether
that packet should be sent. If so, the controller will install new flow entries into corre-
sponding switches to handle future packets of the same flow. StateMon also listens
to the OFPT PACKET IN message. If this message carries a packet that any state-aware
application wants to monitor (Section 5.3.5), StateMon will install OpenConnec-
tion entries in OpenConnection tables (Section 5.3.3) of corresponding switches using
OpenConnection messages (Section 5.3.3) and add a Goto-OCT instruction in the flow
entries to start OpenConnection processing pipeline.
OpenConnection Table
Before illustrating how OpenConnection-enabled switches process packets, we first
explain the structure of the OpenConnection table. An OpenConnection entry, which
is shown in Figure 5.3, has (1) connection match fields, (2) actions for a decision of
forward, drop, and update fields, etc., and (3) OC CON SIG match fields that triggers
switches to send OC CON SIG message when matched. To achieve generality, both
connection and OC CON SIG match fields are directly programmable by state-aware
SDN applications (Section 5.3.5).
If and only if a packet matches connection match fields, the packet will be pro-
cessed by both the OpenFlow and OpenConnection pipeline as shown in Figure 5.4. In
case the packet also matches the OC CON SIG match fields, which means the packet is a
state changing packet, such as FIN in TCP, it will be encapsulated in an OC CON SIG
message and forwarded to the connection tracking module of StateMon in the
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controller. The connection tracking module will maintain the state and manage asso-
ciated switches accordingly. Upon completion of these OpenConnection-based packet
process, the action set that includes the rest of the OpenFlow actions will be executed.
The design of the OpenConnection table is aligned in spirit to the design of the
flow table, so that the data plane can process packets using the simple “match-action”
paradigm. However, OpenConnection tables are more scalable than OpenFlow tables,
because OpenConnection table entries are only installed in the OpenConnection tables
of the two endpoint switches that directly connect the initiating host and the receiving
host of a connection. In contrast, using OpenFlow for each new flow, corresponding
flow entries must be installed in all flow tables of switches that the flow traverses.
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Table 5.2: OpenConnection Messages (C: Controller, S: Switch)
Message Name Direction Description
OC CON SIG S→C Encapsulate entire packet (including payload) and forward it to connection tracking module
OC ADD C→S Install a new entry in an OpenConnection table
OC UPDATE C→S Update an OpenConnection entry
OC REMOVE C→S Remove an OpenConnection entry
OpenConnection Message Exchanging Format
We define four OpenConnection messages to enable state-based connection monitor-
ing. OpenConnection messages help the connection tracking module of StateMon
monitor the overall process of connection establishment and tear-down behaviors oc-
curring in the data plane. Table 5.2 summarizes the four OpenConnection messages
with a brief description of each.
The OC CON SIG message is used to encapsulate the state-changing packet and
conveying it to the controller (switch-to-controller direction). The main difference
from OpenFlow OFPT PACKET IN is that the OC CON SIG message is only for State-
Mon (so that it will not be effective to other SDN applications), and it also contains
a randomly generated unique identifier for the connection to distinguish the affilia-
tion of the message. The other messages are sent from the controller to the switches
to program an OpenConnection table. The connection tracking module generates a
OC ADD message to install a new entry in an OpenConnection table. For instance,
to monitor a TCP connection, it installs an entry to match TCP ACK packet at its
ingress switch of the flow path. OC UPDATE is used for updating an OpenConnection
table entry. If a connection is terminated (or by timeout mechanism), the connection
tracking module sends an OC REMOVE message to remove all associated entries. Com-
pared with OpenFlow, which exchanges messages between the controller and multiple
switches, OpenConnection introduces only a constant number of message exchanges
between the controller and two endpoint switches for handling a specific state-based
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connection. Using TCP as an example, OpenConnection uses eight messages in total
for a TCP connection (see Table 5.5): (1) three OC CON SIG messages, (2) two OC ADD
messages, (3) one OC UPDATE message, and (4) two OC REMOVE messages.
5.3.4 Tracking Connection States
For generality, StateMon maintains a pair of global state table and state man-
agement table for each state-aware application. The connection tracking module
listens to OFPT PACKET IN messages to initialize an entry in the global state table for
a connection and listens to OC CON SIG messages to update the states of the connec-
tion based on state transition rules in the state management table provided by the
application.
Global State Table
The global state table records network-wide connection state information. However,
simply extracting a connection’s state from a specific switch is not sufficient to account
for the overall global state of a connection. Because OpenFlow-enabled switches are
able to rewrite packets’ headers at any point using the Set-Field action, a packet’s
header may look different at its ingress and egress switches. This poses a challenge
for the controller to identify which packets belong to the same connection. To solve
this problem, StateMon bonds a connection’s state (e.g., ESTABLISHED) with
its associated network rules (i.e.,the forward and reverse flow entries) to effectively
monitor and track an active connection.
We design the entry in the global state table as 5-tuple denoted 〈CI , CE, σF , σR, Sa〉.
Connection information at the ingress switch (CI) contains a set of packet header
fields along with its incoming physical switch port, pi. Connection information at
the egress switch (CE) contains the same elements, except po which refers to the out-
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Table 5.3: State Management Table Example for TCP connection. (A or B Refers a
Pair of 〈IP, port〉.)
State
Transition Conditions
Next State
OpenConnection Events
Timeout
Message Type Source Match Fields Message Type Destination OC CON SIG Match Fields
INIT OFPT PACKET IN Ingress A→B, TCP, Flag=SYN SYN SENT OC ADD Ingress A→B, TCP, Flag=ACK ∞
SYN SENT OFPT PACKET IN Egress B→A, TCP, Flag=SYNACK SYNACK SENT OC ADD Egress B→A, TCP, Flag=FIN 5
SYNACK SENT OC CON SIG Ingress A→B, TCP, Flag=ACK ESTABLISHED OC UPDATE Ingress A→B, TCP, Flag=FIN 5
ESTABLISHED OC CON SIG
Ingress A→B, TCP, Flag=FIN
FIN WAIT 1800
Egress B→A, TCP, Flag=FIN
FIN WAIT OC CON SIG
Egress B→A, TCP, Flag=FIN
CLOSED 60
Ingress A→B, TCP, Flag=FIN
CLOSED - - - INIT
OC REMOVE Ingress
0
OC REMOVE Egress
going physical switch port. For instance, CI for a TCP connection can be defined
as 〈src ip, src port, dst ip, dst port, network protocol, pi〉. Note that some fields in CI
and CE (e.g., src ip, src port, dst ip, dst port) might not be identical due to dynamic
packet modification (Set-Field action) in SDNs. σF is a series of identifiers of flow
entries that enable the forward flow, and σR is also a series of identifiers for the re-
verse flow. For example, the forward flow and the reverse flow in Figure 5.1 would
be σF = 〈fe1, fe2, fe3〉 and σR = 〈fe4, fe5, fe6〉, respectively. The last element, Sa,
denotes the state of a connection and it will be further elaborated in Section 5.3.4.
The elements in a global state table entry have several properties. The relation
between CI and CE is to be determined by σF or σR such that CI
σF−→ CE and
C−1E
σR−→ C−1I . C
−1
I and C
−1
E are directly derived from CI and CE by replacing the
source with the destination and changing the incoming port (pi) to the outgoing port
(po). For example, if CI =〈src ip: 10.0.0.1, src port: 3333, dst ip: 10.0.0.2, dst port: 80,
network protocol: tcp, pi: 2〉 then C
−1
I =〈src ip: 10.0.0.2, src port: 80, dst ip: 10.0.0.1,
dst port: 3333, network protocol: tcp, po: 2〉.
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State Management Table
An entry in the state management table is a 5-tuple denoted as 〈State, Transition Con-
ditions, Next State, OpenConnection Events, Timeout〉. When an OFPT PACKET IN or
OC CON SIG message is received, the connection tracking module compares its orig-
inated location and header of the encapsulated packet with the Source and Match
Fields of the current state in the state management table. If the packet meets the
Transition Conditions of the current state, the state will be updated to the Next
State and OpenConnection Events will be triggered. OpenConnection events instruct
the connection tracking module to send OC ADD, OC UPDATE, or OC REMOVE to corre-
sponding switches. The Match Fields in OpenConnection Events will configure the
OpenConnection table entries in corresponding switches to initialize connection and
OC CON SIG match fields. Timeout allows StateMon to automatically close a con-
nection.
Table 5.3 shows how a state-aware application can use the state management
table for the TCP state transitions. A TCP connection starts with INIT state that
transitions to SYN SENT when it receives an OFPT PACKET IN message that contains
a TCP SYN flag. StateMon identifies the location of the ingress switch (I) from the
message, and it sends an OC ADD message back to I with its match fields. StateMon
locates the egress switch (E) as well by listening for the second OFPT PACKET IN
message. OC CON SIG messages collected from I or E are then used to update the
connection states. CLOSED is a temporary state only used for sending OC REMOVE
messages and removing the associated entries. Note that one state can transition to
multiple Next States based on matching conditions and generate a variety of actions
as defined by SDN applications.
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Table 5.4: StateMon APIs
Category API Name Key Parameters Description
Type I
InitGST() Match fields in CI and/or CE
Initialize the global
state table
InitSMT() 5-tuple of state management table Initialize the state
management tableSetInterest() Range of match fields with wildcard
Type II
SearchEntry() Raw packet or ConnectionID
Search an associated
global state entry
GetConnState() ConnectionID
Obtain current state
of a connection
DeleteEntry() ConnectionID Delete a connection
Type III
ConnAttempt() Type of message and raw packet Return one of actions
(allow or drop)StateChange() ConnectionID and next state
5.3.5 StateMon APIs
StateMon provides three types of application programming interfaces (APIs)
for SDN applications so that the applications only need to implement their business
logic. The APIs can be used (1) to configure both the global state table and the state
management table (Type I), (2) to retrieve state information from the global state
table (Type II), and (3) to register callback functions in StateMon to subscribe
specific state-based events (Type III). The APIs are summarized as follows:
• Type I is used to configure the two state-specific tables in StateMon: the
global state table and the state management table. To customize the global
state table, SDN applications can specify match fields for CI or CE (e.g., IP
and port number) to distinguish one connection from another. Applications can
also define a state set for the connection along with its transition rules for the
state management table.
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• Type II APIs are built for sending queries (applications to StateMon) to
retrieve network states, which SDN applications are interested in. Because all
connection information is recorded in the global state table, those queries are
directly conveyed to the global state table.
• Type III APIs are used to register callback functions in StateMon. For
example, when a global state entry is updated, StateMon can call this function
to subscribing applications to allow them to execute their own business logic.
5.4 Stateful Firewall Design
In this section, to demonstrate the practicality and feasibility of StateMon and
state-aware network access management applications in SDNs, we illustrate how a
stateful firewall can take advantage of StateMon to implement its state-aware access
control logic in SDNs.
The stateful firewall application first calls Type I APIs to initialize its global state
table and state management table. We focus on TCP connections as a state-based
protocol for this application. To enforce a stateful firewall policy such as “host B
can communicate with host A if and only if host A initiates the connection,” our
firewall uses the state management table shown in Table 5.3. Then, StateMon calls
the registered callback function (Type III) when a state changing event occurs. The
application only needs to implement the logic in the callback function: (1) a packet
(or flow) heading from host B to host A should be denied when its state is in INIT
or SYNACK SENT and (2) a packet (or flow) heading from host B to host A should
be allowed when its state is in SYN SENT or ESTABLISHED. Thus, the connection
attempt (e.g., TCP SYN) initiated from host B cannot be made whereas the attempt
from host A will pass.
To show some benefits of our stateful firewall, we focus on following features: (1)
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Table 5.5: Additional State Management Table Entries for Unauthorized Access
Prevention
State
Transition Conditions
Next State
OpenConnection Events
Timeout
Message Type Source Match Fields Message Type Destination OC CON SIG Match Fields
SYNACK SENT OC CON SIG Ingress A→B, TCP, Flag=ACK ESTABLISHED OC ADD Egress A→B, TCP, Flag=FIN 5
SYNACK SENT OC CON SIG Ingress A→B, TCP, Flag=ACK ESTABLISHED OC ADD Ingress B→A, TCP, Flag=FIN 5
ESTABLISHED OC CON SIG Egress A→B, TCP, Flag=FIN DETECTED 1800
ESTABLISHED OC CON SIG Ingress B→A, TCP, Flag=FIN DETECTED 1800
DETECTED - - - ESTABLISHED 0
state-aware firewall policy enforcement, (2) connection disruption prevention, and (3)
unauthorized access prevention against active connections.
5.4.1 State-aware Firewall Policy Enforcement
Since StateMon provides global network states to the firewall, our firewall appli-
cation utilizes the state information for the following scenarios: (1) a host attempts
to establish a new connection, (2) the state of an active connection has been updated,
and (3) the firewall application updates the firewall policy.
First, when host A attempts to open a new connection to host B, both host A
and host B exchange initiating signal packets to establish the connection. As soon
as StateMon receives these attempts, the firewall would get relevant information
via the Type III callback function defined when it called ConnAttempt(). If this
attempt violates the pre-defined stateful firewall policy, the initiating packet is im-
mediately denied and the firewall stops the controller from executing the rest of the
OFPT PACKET IN handling process so that no flow entry is sent to the switches.
Second, if a global state entry is updated, the stateful firewall will also be noti-
fied via Type III callback function, StateChange(). Our firewall application per-
forms pair-wise comparison, the current state of the connection against existing
stateful firewall policies. The firewall searches the associated global state entry
by calling SearchEntry() and acquires the connection information from the entry.
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Algorithm 4: Obtaining Affected Entry Set (AES)
Input: New (or Updated) flow entry (nf) and existing flow entries (FE = {e1, e2, ...}) at the same switch.
Output: Affected entry set AES = {a1, a2, ...} such that ai ∈ FE.
1 /* First, append the new flow entry (nf) to AES */
2 AES.append(nf);
3 /* FEt: a set of flow entries installed in table t */
4 FEt ←− retrieveEntries(nf.getSwitchID,nf.getTableID);
5 foreach e ∈ FEt do
6 /* Check if nf has higher priority than e and is dependent with e */
7 if nf .priority ≥ e.priority and nf .match ∩ e.match 6= ∅ then
8 AES.append(e);
9 /* Recursively perform identical operation if e has Goto-OCT instruction */
10 if e.getInstruction contains GotoTable then
11 temp e.match ←− e.applyActions();
12 temp e.setTableID(e.getInstruction.getTableID);
13 AES child = self.(temp e,E);
14 AES.append(AES child);
15 end
16 end
17 end
18 return AES ;
To consider Set-Field actions, it retrieves tracked space denoted T (I, E), getting
〈src ip, src port〉 from I and 〈dst ip, dst port〉 from E. By putting them together,
we obtain T (I, E) = 〈I.src ip, I.src port, E.dst ip, E.dst port〉. Using the combina-
tion of T (I, E) and its current state, the firewall checks for rule compliance with
firewall policies. If the update of the state is not allowed by the policy, the applica-
tion raises an alarm to network administrators and the update is denied by setting
the return value of StateChange() to drop. In case the stateful firewall application
wants to remove the connection, it may invoke DeleteEntry() function to remove the
associated entries from the OpenConnection and flow tables.
The final scenario deals with the case of updating firewall policies. When the
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firewall application updates a stateful rule in its policy set, all active connections
are examined against the new rule to identify potential violations. Because each
firewall policy has a priority, computing dependency relations of firewall rules after
the updates are vital for identifying overlaps between rules. All violating connections
are to be deleted from the network by calling the API DeleteEntry(). As a result, the
associated OpenConnection and flow entries will be flushed from the OpenConnection
tables and flow tables.
5.4.2 Connection Disruption Prevention
A malicious SDN application can manipulate existing flow entries or install new
flow entries to disrupt active connections that consequently damage the availability of
services in the network. To prevent this type of attack, detecting these attempts before
they take effect in the network is mandatory, so our firewall application proactively
analyzes the expected impact of updates on active connections. To this end, the
application computes the Affected Entry Set (AES) as described in Algorithm 4.
When a new flow entry is to be inserted into the network or an existing flow entry
is about to be updated, the application computes its dependencies with existing flow
entries in the same switch. To this end, it first retrieves all flow entries FE from a
specific switch and computes affected flow entries by new (or updated) flow entry nf .
The application next selects the exact flow table affected by nf and builds FEt which
is a subset of FE. Then, it compares the priority and matching conditions between e
and nf , to decide whether e is affected. If nf is dependent on e and has higher priority
than e, the application adds e into AES. If e has a goto instruction, the application
further visits the specified flow table to find AESchild. Considering Set-Field actions
e may have, the actions will be applied first in advance before pipelining to another
flow table. The firewall makes use of AES to detect the connection disruption attacks.
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Detection of connection disruption attacks: Newly installed (or updated) flow
entry nf triggers the application to compute AES and check AES against active
connections obtained from StateMon. The application then compares AES with
σF and σR of each of active connections and invokes the connection tracking module
to re-calculate σ′F and σ
′
R. The updated σ
′
F may change the relation between CI
and CE i.e., CI
σ′
F−→ C ′E . If CE 6= C
′
E, the firewall concludes that the candidate flow
entry nf will disrupt an active connection. nf may also disrupt the reverse flow of
the connection. If C−1E
σ′
R−→ C ′−1I and C
−1
I 6= C
′−1
I , the firewall also concludes nf will
disrupt an active connection.
Countermeasure: When the controller receives the request of installation of a new
flow entry nf which may cause a connection disruption or interruption, StateMon
treats it as a candidate flow entry and holds it until StateMon evaluates its impact
on the network. Upon completion of computing AES and σ′F (or σ
′
R), if the firewall
detects any error such as CE 6= C
′
E or C
−1
I 6= C
′−1
I , it raises an alarm to the adminis-
trator about the attempt. The administrator can decide whether it is legitimate and
an intended request. If it turns out nf is valid, StateMon allows it to be installed
in the network. Otherwise, the firewall rejects the installation of nf .
5.4.3 Unauthorized Access Prevention
An attacker can attempt unauthorized access into an active connection by per-
forming a man-in-the-middle attack such as TCP sequence inference attack to spoof
packets. TCP protocol is inherently vulnerable to sequence inference attacks [99, 98].
We do not fundamentally solve these known vulnerabilities but can partially prevent
specific types of unauthorized access to an active connection (e.g., TCP termination
attacks). If an attacker successively infers the sequence number of the next packet,
he/she will be able to create a spoofed termination packet by setting the TCP flags
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with FIN (i.e., man-in-the middle attack [39]). Our firewall can leverage StateMon
to detect such an attack by customizing the state management table and adding
OpenConnection entries.
Detection of connection termination attacks: The key idea of the detection mech-
anism is to add additional checking logic in the egress switch for the forward flow
(or the ingress switch for the reverse flow) by installing new OpenConnection entries.
In addition to the state management table described in Table 5.3, the firewall adds
additional transition rules (Table 5.5) to install OpenConnection entries and detect
connection termination attacks. The firewall first creates a new OpenConnection
Events (the first line in Table 5.5) for the SYNACK SENT state that instructs the
egress switch to install a new OpenConnection entry that matches the forward flow.
OC CON SIG match fields of this entry will match the TCP FIN packet that belongs
to the forward flow. Benign TCP FIN requests sent from the initiating host will be
checked at its ingress switch by Table 5.3, so StateMon transitions the state of the
connection to the ESTABLISHED state. Hence, OC CON SIG fields of the third entry
in Table 5.5 will not match the packet. However, attacking packet which is forged
by an attacker in the middle of the flow path will match the OC CON SIG conditions
of the third entry at the egress switch which results the state to be DETECTED.
DETECTED state defined in the fifth line in Table 5.5 is a temporary state that is
used to inform the existence of a TCP termination attack to the firewall. In the case
of the reverse flow, the firewall leverages the second and the fourth entry for detecting
connection termination attacks. In such a way, the firewall can capture this type of
attack with the help of StateMon.
Countermeasure: To protect the network from the aforementioned unauthorized
access (e.g., TCP termination attack), the firewall can take two countermeasures: (1)
return actions in the Type III callback function with drop to drop the spoofed packet
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and (2) rollback the connection state (DETECTED to ESTABLISHED) to maintain
the connectivity between end hosts. In addition, the firewall may add complementary
business logic in a Type III callback function to implement post processing behaviors
such as sending warning messages to the network administrator.
5.5 Implementation and Evaluation
5.5.1 Implementation
To implement StateMon, we chose a widely used controller, Floodlight, and
a reference OpenFlow software switch implementation, Open vSwitch (ovswitch).
The routing module and link discovery modules in Floodlight are used to provide
network topology information to the connection tracking module. To track existing
flow entries in the network and build its reachability graph, we used header space
analysis [73] which translates each flow entry into a transition function that consists
of a set of binaries, 0, 1, and x (for wildcard), to represent its matching conditions
and actions. We also added OFPT PACKET IN listener within the controller along
with an OpenConnection message handler to receive the state changing packets and
program OpenConnection tables. Each global state entry has a unique identifier to
distinguish it from other entries for ease of maintenance. The connection tracking
module leverages the OFPT FLOW MOD OpenFlow message to construct controller-to-
switch OpenConnection messages.
In the data plane, we implemented the OpenConnection table along with Open-
Connection message handler. Because current versions of ovswitch can only support
OpenFlow up to version 1.3.0, which cannot inspect TCP flags and sequence/ac-
knowledgment numbers, we implemented a parsing module to additionally retrieve
TCP flags and sequence/acknowledgment numbers. Then, we modified the legacy
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OpenFlow pipelining logic to enable OpenConnection-based packet processing. In
total, less than 500 lines of C code were added to the ovswitch code base.
To implement the stateful firewall we leveraged a built-in firewall application in
Floodlight to add a stateful checking module. A stateful checking module in the
firewall is able to access the global state table by using StateMon APIs for checking
and enforcing its stateful firewall policy. We added the state parameter to REST
interface methods provided by the built-in firewall so that users can define a stateful
policy using REST requests. To prevent connection disruption and unauthorized
access, we added a listener in the Static Flow Pusher module in Floodlight, so the
application is able to intercept potentially malicious or accidentally harmful flow entry
update requests and analyze their impacts on active connections before they become
effective.
5.5.2 Evaluation
To manage the state of a connection, existing solutions add the transition logic of
the connection in the data plane (Table 5.3). The fundamental question, therefore,
is how many additional messages and/or performance overhead are introduced to
achieve the same goal in StateMon. To this end, we conducted experiments using
three virtual machines, each of which had a quad-core CPU and 8GB memory and
ran a Linux operating system (Ubuntu). One virtual machine was used to run the
Floodlight controller and each of another ran Mininet [22] to simulate two networks.
After we built two separated networks, we connected them using a GRE tunnel to
flexibly add new hosts and links in one network without impacting the other network.
We also modified the size of the network by changing the number of intermediaries
(i.e., network switches).
100
Evaluation of StateMon
To measure the worst-case performance of StateMon, it was configured to monitor
every connection in the network. However, in a real-world deployment, StateMon
only needs to monitor connections specified by state-aware applications, which will
only improve the performance.
We first conducted experiments on an OpenConnection-enabled switch to test the
overhead created by StateMon in the data plane. OpenConnection enabled-switch
spent less than 1µ for checking the affiliation of incoming traffic in an OpenCon-
nection table when the table is set to have 100 entries. Creating and updating the
corresponding entries in the OpenConnection table have been completed within 2µs
on average.
In the controller side, the connection tracking module is in charge of installing/delet-
ing an entry in the global state table and computing next state using the state man-
agement table. This module spent less than 3µs on average to complete those two
tasks when there exist 100 connections in the network. To evaluate how much of the
delay can be attributed to network latency, we compared the numbers of message
exchanges generated by both OpenFlow protocol and OpenConnection protocol. We
collected real network traffics (five PCAP files) from different sources (available at
[26, 20]) to generate real network traffic. Our testing framework (1) automatically
identifies source and destination IP addresses of each packet in a PCAP file, (2)
dynamically generates hosts for those IP addresses in a network, and (3) sends the
packet through their network interfaces. Figure 5.5a shows the number of message
exchanges. The first traffic is collected from VoIP traffic and consists of 32 connec-
tion attempts and 29 successful establishments. Network traffic generated by this
file caused the controller to generate 324 OpenFlow messages along with 215 Open-
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Connection messages, which mean 10 OpenFlow messages and 7 OpenConnection
Messages per connection on average. For counting OpenFlow messages, we excluded
unrelated messages, such as OFPT HELLO, OFPT ECHO REQUEST, and FEATURE REPLY,
and filtered out unrelated OFPT PACKET IN messages used to handle connectionless
packets, such as LLDP, ARP, and DNS. Therefore, OpenConnection protocol actually
generated much fewer messages than OpenFlow protocol. To account for theoretical
number of OpenFlow messages, we develop the equation (5.1). For one way flow, we
need one OFPT PACKET IN message and n number of OFPT FLOW MOD messages where
n is the number of switches on the path. Because a connection requires bi-directional
flows, it is computed by 2 ∗ (1 + n).
BOF (n) = 2 ∗ (1 + n) (5.1)
However, the number of OpenConnection messages does not depend on n. Because
StateMon requires eight messages for monitoring a connection, every PCAP type in
Figure 5.5a creates ≤ 8 OpenConnection messages per connection. Considering the
third traffic that contains DoS attacks, it has generated a large number of OpenFlow
messages due to substantial connection attempts, while the count of OpenConnection
messages remained unchanged. This results clearly show StateMon creates mini-
mal message exchanges under any circumstances. Figure 5.5b shows how StateMon
scales with respect to increasing the number of switches in the network. To stress an
overhead, we maintained 300 connections when measuring Figure 5.5b. As expected,
OpenFlow message count was linearly increased in accordance with the growing num-
ber of switches while StateMon maintains a constant number of message exchanges
no matter how many switches exist in the network.
To discover overall overhead of StateMon including network latency, we first
measured the time for establishing a connection using a TCP handshake with and
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Figure 5.5: Message Exchanges in StateMon
without StateMon. As defined in Table 5.3, StateMon exchanges 4 messages to
monitor a TCP handshake. While a TCP handshake took 3.356ms on average without
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Figure 5.6: Throughput Between End Hosts
StateMon, it took 3.651ms on average with StateMon. This means StateMon
only introduced a 0.295ms delay, which is 8.79% overhead for a TCP handshake.
To evaluate the overall performance degradation caused by StateMon, we used the
throughput between hosts as another metric. We used Iperf [1] for this experiment.
Iperf client (host in network A) initiated a new connection with Iperf server (host
in network B) and exchanged a set of packets to measure the throughput. In an
Open vSwitch and Floodlight setting without StateMon, the throughput scored an
average of 10.74 Gbits/sec (100 runs). With StateMon enabled, the throughput
scored 10.40 Gbits/sec on average, with only 3.27% throughput degradation.
Evaluation of Stateful Network Firewall
We configured the number of firewall policies to be 1k and fixed the size of global
state entries with 10k to measure the overhead of our stateful firewall.
For performing state-aware firewall policy enforcement, the firewall spent 1.02ms
on average. When a host attempts to establish a new connection, it took 0.83ms to
complete the searches with existing firewall policies, and the attempt was immediately
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denied in real-time (0.01ms). Whenever a global state entry is updated, the firewall
performed a pair-wise comparison of the update with existing state-based rules within
1.16ms, and it took 0.26ms to delete the violating connection from the network. In
case of firewall policy updates, the firewall finished its dependency checking mostly
within 0.5ms, and spent a similar time (0.31ms) for deleting the conflicting connection
from the network.
Preventing connection disruptions in the network is another key feature in our
firewall. To this end, the firewall computes the Affected Entry Set (AES), and gen-
erating AES took less than 0.35ms on average. In addition to AES, the firewall
computes updated flow entries, namely σ′F or σ
′
R, to further compute C
′
E and C
′
I ,
respectively. By comparing the relation the old CE and the updated C
′
E, the firewall
draw a conclusion of potential connection disruption iff CE 6= C
′
E. All these tasks
were completed in 0.49ms on average.
To detect/prevent unauthorized access into active connections, the firewall ma-
nipulates the state management table as described in Section 5.4.3. As shown in
Table 5.5, the firewall proactively installs necessary rules in the state management
table. Once a connection has successively been established between two end hosts, the
firewall asks StateMon to install an additional OpenConnection entry to monitor
the terminating packet at its egress switch. Since the firewall will be directly notified
by StateMon when a connection termination attack is detected, the firewall only
implements a logic to drop the attack packet. The firewall drops this packet and
recovers the connection’s state to its previous one, ESTABLISHED. Duration time
for handling this type of unauthorized access took around 0.44ms in total.
We also checked the scalability of the stateful firewall application by measuring
the duration time for completing three types of strategies. We gradually increased
the number of existing connections from 20k to 100k. As shown in Figure 5.7, state-
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Figure 5.7: Scalability Analysis of Stateful Firewall
aware policy enforcement took almost constant time (≈ 1ms) no matter how many
connections exist in the network. The firewall spent more time in preventing connec-
tion disruptions than that of unauthorized access prevention due to the computation
overhead incurred by Algorithm 4. However, overall duration time for both cases lin-
early increased with respect to increasing number of connections and took less than
3 milliseconds at 100k connections, which is manageable.
Evaluation of Other Application: Port Knocking
Even though we mainly focused on TCP connection in this chapter, a key design goal
is that StateMon can support different state-based protocols, such as port knocking.
Port knocking is a method to open a closed port by checking a unique knock sequence,
a series of connection attempts destined to different ports [80]. Thus, we developed
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this application to demonstrate how other network access management schemes can
be also implemented using StateMon in SDNs.
For example, an application may want to allow a connection iff a series of requests
matches a specific port order of A, B, C, and D. By modifying the state management
table in StateMon, the application can receive state-changing packets by listening
OFPT PACKET IN messages. In other words, the initial state can transition to the first
knock state (e.g., PORT KNOCK1) when the packet is destined to port A, waiting
for the subsequent knocking sequence (port B). Such a way, the application opens the
closed port of a server if the state becomes the OPEN state.
To evaluate the overhead incurred by StateMon-based application, we reim-
plemented the port knocking that has been demonstrated in prior work [80], which
performs the same functions but locally maintains the state in the switch. We in-
stalled the state transition rules for the port knocking in the switch. To complete
the knocking sequence, it took 104.96ms without StateMon, and StateMon-based
application spent 113.83ms in total (8.45% overhead).
5.6 Related Work
As explained in Table 5.3, majority of existing solutions are focused on performing
stateful inspection in the data plane [88, 90, 54, 120, 41, 8, 40, 124]. There is some
debate as to whether this design goes against the spirit of SDN’s control and data
plane separation. In addition, none of these approaches give much attention on how to
leverage the logically centralized controller for providing a global state visibility of the
network to applications. In contrast, the unique contribution of StateMon comes
from its consolidated state checking mechanism enabled by OpenConnection protocol
and the connection tracking module. Specifically, StateMon can provide global
state-based connection information to SDN applications along with several APIs that
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allows them to define application-specific states. Even though OpenNF [58] attempts
to achieve a similar state sharing, it mainly collects a state of middleboxes (e.g.,
firewall, proxy, and load-balancer), not generic network states.
A number of verification tools [95, 67, 85, 75, 74, 73] for checking network in-
variants and policy correctness in SDNs have been recently proposed. FortNOX [95]
was proposed as a software extension to provide security constraint enforcement for
OpenFlow-based controllers. However, the conflict detection algorithm provided by
FortNOX is incapable of analyzing stateful security policies. FlowGuard [67] was
recently introduced to facilitate not only an accurate detection but also a flexible res-
olution of firewall policy violations in dynamic OpenFlow-based networks. However,
the design of FlowGuard fully relies on flow-based rules in the data plane and is only
capable of building a stateless firewall application for SDNs. Anteater [85] is indeed an
offline system and cannot be applied for a real-time flow tracking. VeriFlow [75] and
NetPlumber [74] are able to check the compliance of network updates with specified
invariants in real time. VeriFlow uses graph search techniques to verify network-wide
invariants and deals with dynamic changes. NetPlumber utilizes Header Space Anal-
ysis [73] in an incremental manner to ensure real-time response for checking network
policies through building a dependency graph. Nevertheless, none of those tools are
capable of checking stateful network properties in SDNs.
5.7 Discussions
The OpenFlow protocol is evolving continuously, and the latest version (v1.5.0)
has been recently released [30]. The newest version of OpenFlow attempts to add
TCP flags for the extended matching criteria to address the problem of insufficient
L4 header inspection capability as we have discussed.
However, the newest version of OpenFlow could not answer critical questions
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related to the maintenance and manipulation of network connection states. Especially,
it does not articulate how to leverage TCP flags to monitor states in both the switch
and controller. We expect that our design of OpenConnection in StateMon could
provide an inspirational solution for OpenFlow to build and enable its future stateful
inspection scheme.
While we took great efforts to realize state-aware applications for SDNs, the de-
ployment of StateMon to real-world production networks requires additional con-
siderations in terms of network security. For example, defense mechanisms against
DDoS attacks discussed in [110] may need to be considered in StateMon. In addi-
tion, the current design and implementation of StateMon utilize OpenFlow-based
controller and switch modules, hence it only works in the context of an OpenFlow-
based environment. However, the main idea of StateMon, which is to provide state
tracking framework for various network applications, can be also realized in other
network paradigms, such as Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [3, 61] .
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have articulated network access control issues in SDNs and
presented a state-aware connection tracking framework called StateMon that facil-
itates the control and data planes of SDN to enable stateful inspection schemes. In
the control plane, we have designed a novel connection tracking mechanism using a
global state table and a state management table to track active connections. To en-
able a state-aware data plane, we have introduced a new OpenConnection protocol,
which defines four message formats and a state-aware OpenConnection table. We
have implemented StateMon using Floodlight and Open vSwitch along with two
access management applications (i.e., a stateful network firewall application and a
port knocking application) for SDNs, to demonstrate the flexibility of StateMon.
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Our experimental results have demonstrated that StateMon and two state-aware
network access management applications showed manageable performance overhead
to enable critical state-aware protection of SDNs.
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Chapter 6
HONEYPROXY: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
NEXT-GENERATION HONEYNET VIA SDN
6.1 Introduction
Today’s internet system has evolved rapidly, leading to more and more business
transactions (e.g., e-commerce and banking) carried out exclusively over the network.
These sensitive transactions call for a need to provide a secure and reliable system
that can effectively prevent security breaches, to preserve the integrity of the data
and protect customers [81]. In addition to securing the integrity of the data, network
infrastructure is faced with new exploits, automated scanning tools, and bots, which
results in a great loss of business assets and units [96, 32].
It is difficult, if not impossible, to protect the network if we do not have knowledge
of the attacker’s techniques. In this way, network defenders can remain up-to-date
on the latest exploits, tools, and bots. We require software tools and techniques to
study behaviors of attackers and exploits. Some research and studies carried out in
this direction provide robust mechanisms for early detection and prevention of such
attacks thereby securing the network infrastructure. One such attempt is the advent
of honeypots. A honeypot is a system that is designed to intentionally let attackers
probe, scrutinize and ultimately exploit the system by exposing a set of vulnerable
services [116, 32, 106]. The primary purpose of a honeypot is to closely monitor the
emulated system to learn attackers’ behaviors and collect malicious data during and
after the exploitation of the honeypot. Honeypots are under active attack by real
adversaries, therefore they are often isolated from the real operating system, services,
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or network. Therefore, honeypots’ collected data and attackers’ log can provide early
warnings of new attacks and exploitation, to help administrators protect the real
systems and networks from real adversaries.
Honeypots are generally categorized into two types: a low-interaction honeypot
and a high-interaction honeypot. The main difference between them lies on their
complexity and the level of interaction they provide to the attacker. Low-interaction
honeypots emulate operating systems and other services, therefore low-interaction
honeypots do not provide attackers much control. The main advantage stems from
their simplicity (i.e., easy deployment and maintenance) and the low risk factor be-
cause they are not real production system. High-interaction honeypots are typically
actual systems (i.e., not emulated systems), and therefore elicit more interactive in-
formation from attackers than that of low-interaction honeypots. However, the high
level or interactivity has a downside in considerable maintenance and deployment cost
with a high risk factor.
As an example, kippo [21] is one of the well-known low-interaction honeypots
that emulates the ssh service to record brute force attacks and log all shell activities
performed during the active session with attackers. However, shortcomings of kippo
include a risk of being easily fingerprinted due to its nature of an insufficient level
of interactions. To emulate the real ssh service, kippo mimics several functionalities
using hard-coded strings, which make it vulnerable to fingerprinting attacks [62, 6].
A honeynet is an evolution of a honeypot, and it consists of a collection of hon-
eypots. However, this collection poses the same weakness. In addition, the first
honeynet architecture (Gen-I [115]) has first been proposed in the year of 2002, and
the latest architecture, Gen-III [33], was built in 2004. Due to the outdated honeynet
architecture, existing honeynet suffers from insufficient data control mechanisms and
data capture capability. As described in Table 6.1, honeypots kept evolving (see
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Table 6.1: Emerging Honeypots and Their Last Updates (As of September 2016).
Honeypot Interaction Level Emulated Services Last Commit
Glastopf [12] Low HTTP Aug 16
HIHAT [14, 91] High HTTP Apr 16
Honeyd [16, 96] Low Network Dec 13
Dionaea [10] Low HTTP, FTP, SMB Jun 2014
Honeytrap [18] Low TCP Jun 2016
Kippo [21] Low SSH Oct 2015
Conpot [9] Low ICS (SCADA) Aug 2016
Last Commit in Table 6.1) to accommodate an emerging services (e.g., industrial
control system, or ICS) and catch up the enormous growth in well-crafted attacks
and exploits. However, the latest architecture (Gen-III) remained unchanged for
more than a decade—it is consequently losing its momentum. For example, inbound-
/outbound traffic control mechanisms in Gen-III architecture cannot prevent internal
propagation of malware within a honeynet because access control rules are mainly en-
forced by a custom gateway called honeywall [51, 84]. It is also incapable to support
the transition between a low-interaction honeypot and a high-interaction honeypot.
Low-interaction honeypots are beneficial to collect high level information about at-
tackers (e.g., username and password pair) whereas high-interaction honeypots focus
on collecting low level details [15]. However, existing honeynet architecture does not
provide a practical way to fully utilize the advantages of both low-interaction and
high-interaction honeypots.
In order to solve aforementioned problems, we argue that the architecture of cur-
rent honeynet should be redesigned to provide more flexibility in terms of its network
access management. We observe that such flexibility and network access controls can
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be satisfied by taking advantage of Software-defined Networking (SDN [23]). SDN ba-
sically provides a centralized network management platform by decoupling the control
plane (e.g., exchanging network rules) from the data plane (e.g., network switches).
SDN can centrally configure routing policies of connected devices via the SDN con-
troller and can provide a global view of the network to SDN applications to help them
easily build network-wide business logic. These strengths of SDN have high potentials
to address the limitations of existing honeypots and honeynet architecture.
Thus, we propose a novel honeynet architecture to overcome the limitations of
existing honeypots and honeynet architecture by leveraging SDN technology. Hon-
eyProxy consists of the proxy module and corresponding SDN application. It takes
the form of a reverse proxy to provide improved control over incoming and outgo-
ing traffic while obtaining network configuration via the SDN controller. Malicious
traffic from attackers is redistributed to all associated honeypots, and HoneyProxy
selects one response from the response queue that does not contain fingerprinting
indicator(s). To prevent internal malware propagation, HoneyProxy cooperates
with the SDN controller to detect any anomalies within the network. Supporting a
dynamic transition between a low-interaction honeypot and a high-interaction hon-
eypot is realized by enabling three types of operating modes.
The contributions we make in this chapter are summarized as follows:
• We propose an SDN-based honeynet architecture called HoneyProxy that
consists of a reverse proxy module and of a corresponding SDN application.
HoneyProxy tackles important problems in existing honeypots and honeynet
architecture: (1) fingerprinting attacks targeting honeypots, (2) internal mal-
ware propagation in honeynet, and (3) lack of honeypot transition.
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• We propose a connection management engine that supports three operating
modes: (1) Transparent Mode, (2) Multicast Mode, and (3) Relay Mode. Based
on the decision of HoneyProxy-enabled controller, malicious traffic is pro-
cessed differently so as to meet our design goals (Section 6.3). To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first attempted to introduce flexibility to honeynets.
• We implement a prototype of HoneyProxy that is written in both Python and
C. Our experimental results show that the TCP throughput of HoneyProxy
achieves the line rate TCP throughput (942 Mbps) using multiple worker pro-
cesses. The latency incurred by HoneyProxy is in the range of 0.5 − 1.2
milliseconds on average.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the problems
we tackle in this chapter. Section 6.3 describes our design strategies along with the
architecture and building blocks of our system. In Section 6.4, we introduce the
core mechanism of the connection management engine. Section 6.5 focuses on flow
programming modules. Implementation details are discussed in Section 6.6 followed
by our experimental results (Section 6.7). Section 6.8 introduces related works, and
Section 6.9 discusses several important issues. In Section 6.10, we conclude this
chapter.
6.2 Problem Statement
Existing honeypots suffer from fingerprinting attacks, and current honeynet archi-
tecture suffers from internal malware propagation and a lack of honeypot transition
mechanisms.
Vulnerable to fingerprinting attacks. A fundamental drawback of existing
honeypots is that they can be easily fingerprinted by attackers. The essential objective
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of honeypots is to collect as many attacks as possible to learn attacker’s behaviors and
to discover new types of attacks and malware to provide early warnings to network
administrators. However, lack of exposed functionalities and insufficient interactions
of honeypots (especially low-interaction honeypots) hinder attackers from probing
and exploiting the system. or example, existing ssh honeypots such as kippo [21]
can be easily fingerprinted by Linux commands such as uname -a. Because kippo
does not implement the entire functionality of the uname command, it prints out the
hard-coded timestamp “Wed Nov 4 20:45:37 UTC 2009” (see Table 6.2). In this way,
attackers can instantly identify the presence of honeypots, which reduces the effective-
ness of collecting attacker behavior. Existing honeynet data control mechanisms do
not take into account the fingerprinting attach, thus, removing honeypots themselves
must remove emulation artifacts. In other words, neither honeypots nor honeynet
architecture is capable to prevent fingerprinting attempts.
Internal propagation of malware. Current honeynet architecture cannot
monitor internal traffic because access control mechanisms are enforced at the custom
gateway called the honeywall. The honeywall monitors incoming and outgoing traffic
at a fixed location, and the honeywall acts as a transitional network firewall. Due
to the fixed location of a honeywall, monitoring and preventing internal propagation
of malware in the honeynet is difficult. In general, honeypots are not to be trusted
because attackers are encouraged to actively exploit the honeypots. Therefore, if
a honeypot is compromised, it can easily infect other honeypots coexisting in the
same network. To prevent these incidents, administrators may want to add host-
based protection mechanisms within a machine (e.g., anti-virus, iptables, or sandbox),
however host-based solutions are not feasible because the attacker, who is taking
control of the honeypot, can circumvent these countermeasures. This is why existing
honeynet architecture should be redesigned to better provide network-level protection.
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Dynamic transition between low interaction honeypot and high inter-
action honeypot. Based on the level of interaction with attackers, honeypots are
generally categorized into two types: low-interaction honeypots and high-interaction
honeypots. Low-interaction honeypots emulate a set of real functionalities and ex-
pose (fake) vulnerable and (fake) exploitable services to attackers. The advantages
of using them include the ease of deployment and a low possibility of compromise,
however they can be easily fingerprinted. In particular, low-interaction honeypots are
widely used in the early stage of attacks to collect information on scanning attacks
and login attempts (i.e., username/password pairs). High-interaction honeypots im-
plement the majority of the real service (e.g., ssh and http), along with exploitable
and/or emulated vulnerabilities. While high-interaction honeypots provide deeper
and realistic interactions to attackers, they require sophisticated configurations, high
maintenance cost, and high possibility of compromise. Consequently, current hon-
eynet mechanisms totally rely on the capability of each honeypot, resulting in the
loss of potential opportunities for maximizing the advantages of both low-interaction
honeypots and high-interaction honeypots. For example, we could consider to acti-
vate low-interaction honeypots for massive attacks or the login phase of an attack,
while high-interaction honeypots provide more interactive attacker actions after a
successful login event. Honeybrid [83, 15] strives to facilitate the use of both honey-
pots by supporting transition mechanisms between a low-interaction honeypot and a
high-interaction honeypot. However, this approach does not provide a flexible way to
configure when and how to migrate the establish connection from the one to another.
6.3 HoneyProxy: Design and Architecture
HoneyProxy is a novel next-generation honeynet architecture, which leverages
Software-Defined Networking. In this section, we describe the key design goals of our
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Figure 6.1: Overview of HoneyProxy.
approach, and we illustrate the architecture of HoneyProxy along with the detailed
building blocks.
6.3.1 Design Goals
To overcome the limitations of existing honeypots and current honeynet archi-
tecture, we present an innovative SDN-based honeynet architecture called Hon-
eyProxy. We define the following design goals that any next-generation honeynet
architecture should support:
• Globalization. The approach should globally monitor all internal traffic to
prevent compromised honeypots from propagating malware within the network.
Globalization should also include centralized network monitoring and network-
wide policy enforcement.
• Flexibility. The honeynet architecture must support a smooth transition from
a low-interaction honeypot to a high-interaction honeypot or vice versa. This
transaction should also be flexible and configurable.
• Stealthiness. The approach must be covert, in that it has to hide the existence
118
of itself and minimize the exposure of residing honeypots as much as possible.
From this point of view, the approach should not incur noticeable delay in
conducting the given tasks, as the delay can result in the detection of the
honeynet.
• Generalization. The approach should be applicable—regardless of the type
of residing honeypots or running services. The key question here is related to
how the approach can address the redundant services in the network offered by
different honeypots.
6.3.2 HoneyProxy Overview
At a high level, HoneyProxy consists of a proxy module and a HoneyProxy-
enabled SDN controller (see Figure 6.1). Multiple honeypots are connected to differ-
ent switches, and those switches are centrally managed by the HoneyProxy con-
troller. SDN allows network administrators to have centralized control over the entire
network by separating the data plane from the control plane. Based on the residing
honeypots, the HoneyProxy controller centrally installs the necessary network rules
and enforces security rules within the network. On the proxy side, the request sent
by the attackers passes through a series of modules in the proxy and is transmitted
to a set of relevant honeypots (based on the request).
As shown in Figure 6.1, the proxy pushes a specific type of tagging information
inside the packet headers. HoneyProxy controller then creates SDN rules that
check the tagging information at the SDN switches to enforce network policies. The
proxy module has three operational modes. Based on the decision made by the
HoneyProxy controller, the operating mode of the proxy would be reconfigured
when necessary (see Section 6.4). The proxy module inspects the payloads of response
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Figure 6.2: HoneyProxy Reshapes the Landscape of Honeynet Architecture To-
ward One ‘BIG’ Honeypot.
to see if it includes any fingerprinting indicators that may expose the presence of
honeypots and/or honeynet. Upon discovering an indicator, the proxy module signals
to the HoneyProxy controller to take appropriate action, such as changing the
proxy mode or updating network configurations, accordingly. Section 6.3.3 provides
detailed architecture and building blocks of HoneyProxy.
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Figure 6.2 illustrates how HoneyProxy changes the landscape of honeynet ar-
chitecture. Traditional honeynet architecture runs multiple honeypots behind the
custom firewall (honeywall), shown in Figure 6.2a. This architecture allows residing
honeypots to run their emulated services, which are possibly redundant with other
honeypots as shown in Table 6.1. One consequence of this architecture is that only
one vulnerable services is accessible to an attacker at any given time, while the rest
are inactive. Because of these reasons, lots of manual configurations of honeypots
are necessary to avoid duplicating services, and it can be easily detected since the
configurations remain unchanged.
HoneyProxy, shown in Figure 6.2b, allows us to consider the honeypots as one
large honeypot running many vulnerable services, which are the union of individ-
ual honeypots. It does not require the extra burden of running redundant services
across diverse honeypots, because the proxy module distributes requests and selects
the best response. In other words, from the attackers’ perspective, our honeynet
would appear as one large honeypot. To effectively generate multicast messages, the
proxy module in HoneyProxy is internally conducting network address translation
(NAT [119]) and deep packet inspection (DPI [43]) to interconnect the same services
across honeypots.
Our approach has several strengths compared to existing honeynet architecture:
(1) It allows attackers to easily access a variety of vulnerable services, which allows
greater elicitation of behaviors; (2) Fingerprinting attacks can be mitigated by dy-
namically selecting the most appropriate response, which reduces fingerprinting and
allows for collecting more attack data and learning attacker behavior; (3) SDN con-
troller can globally monitor the entire honeypot network to detect abnormal behav-
iors of the honeypots (e.g., connection attempts between honeypots) so that internal
propagation of malware can easily be prevented at first hand.
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6.3.3 Architecture and Building Blocks
The HoneyProxy architecture is illustrated in Figure 6.3, and HoneyProxy
consists of a reverse proxy module and an SDN application. This design separates
the concerns of performing network programming and packet processing. The reverse
proxy module processes incoming and outgoing traffic using three sub-components:
Request Handler, Connection Management Engine, and Response Scrubber. The
counterpart, the SDN application, manages network configurations and enforces SDN
rules, while monitoring suspicious packets within the network. Detailed building
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blocks of HoneyProxy are introduced as follows:
Request Handler is responsible for handling the incoming traffic. When a
packet arrives at the Request Handler, it first checks the payload to decide if the traffic
contains any known fingerprinting attacks, which can fingerprint or compromise the
honeypot (see Table [21]). In case of scanning attacks that use OSI L3 or below, the
Request Handler adds the scanning tag to the packets and directly forwards them so
that SDN switches can direct them to IDS running honeypot. Based on this result,
the Request Handler signals the Connection Management Engine to perform network
address translation (NAT) and deep packet inspection (DPI) to manage the sessions.
Thus the request handler mainly monitors the incoming traffic for suspicious attacks
and sends the results to the Connection Management Engine.
Connection Management Engine Engine is the core of the reverse proxy
module that orchestrates the Request Handler and the Response Handler. The main
goal of this engine is to select the response among multiple responses and maintain the
sessions to support the three operating modes of HoneyProxy (Section 6.4). The
Connection Management Engine also adds tagging information to packet headers
of incoming traffic, which allows SDN switches to forward them to the matching
destination.
Response Handler is responsible for detecting fingerprinting indicators that
may exist in a given response. As defined in Table 6.2, the matching packet would
trigger this handler to notify the HoneyProxy controller. Responses from associated
honeypots are recorded in the R Queue, and it waits for the arrival of remaining
responses until a size of the queue equals to the number of associated honeypots. If
the queue size matches (or by timeout event), the Connection Management Engine
selects the most appropriate response from the R Queue.
Flow Programming Module runs as a part of the SDN application of the
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HoneyProxy controller. This module is responsible for notifying the controller
to add an SDN rule (i.e., a flow entry) that corresponds to the particular traffic
processed by the reverse proxy. The packets marked as scanning will be forwarded
to the honeypot running intrusion detection systems (e.g., snort [28]). Other packets
with the three operating modes would be counted to keep record of attackers’ behavior
and further utilize them to make a better strategies for attackers.
Mode Decision Module concludes the serving mode of the proxy. For those
attackers who conducted fingerprinting attacks are to be mainly served by high-
interaction honeypots rather than low-interaction honeypots. Based on several cri-
teria (Section 6.4.3), this modules sends REST request to the proxy to change the
operating mode (see Table 6.3).
To achieve the first design goal (globalization), HoneyProxy leverages SDN to
globally make a decision on operating modes of HoneyProxy and enforce network
and security rules via the SDN controller. HoneyProxy monitors all flows in the
network via the SDN controller so that any connection attempts generated by (poten-
tially) compromised honeypots can be logged, monitored, and prevented. To support
dynamic transitions across different honeypots in flight (the second design goal), the
proxy module in HoneyProxy has Connection Management Engine that selects the
most appropriate reply from a receiving queue and tracks the state changes of all
active connections. In this way, HoneyProxy can also transparently migrate the
connection from one honeypot to another. To satisfy the third design goal, stealth-
iness, HoneyProxy attempts to minimize the performance gaps between different
operating modes of HoneyProxy using multi-processing techniques [94]. As elabo-
rated in Section 6.7, latency gaps between different modes are less than a millisecond
(< 1 ms), which is not distinguishable when attackers connect over the internet. To
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Figure 6.4: Transition Conditions Among Three Operating Modes.
meet the last design goal, generalization, HoneyProxy establishes multiple sockets
with the associated honeypots to support L4 or higher in OSI layer. Because vulner-
able services are mostly utilizing application layer protocol (L7) except for scanning
attacks, HoneyProxy can accommodate most of protocols. For scanning attacks
utilizing L3 or below, SDN application of HoneyProxy redirects those packets to
one of honeypots that runs an intrusion detection system (which is specifically con-
figured to detect scanning attacks).
6.4 Operating Modes and Connection Management Mechanism
The Connection Management Engine supports three operating modes: transpar-
ent mode (T-Mode), multicast mode (M-Mode), and relay mode (R-Mode). The
purpose of these modes is to efficiently and effectively deliver malicious traffic to rele-
vant honeypots and select the most appropriate reply among multiple responses from
honeypots.
6.4.1 Operating Modes
Figure 6.4 illustrates the three operating modes that HoneyProxy supports.
Each mode is intended to provide the following features to HoneyProxy:
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• Transparent Mode (T-Mode): T-Mode accounts for the initial stage of at-
tacks such as login trials. Because these attempts are normally launched in an
automated manner (e.g., bots or scripts), low-interaction honeypots can effec-
tively handle such attacks. For scalability reason, HoneyProxy only performs
network address translation without conducting deep packet inspection.
• Multicast Mode (M-Mode): Upon the completion of successful login
events, HoneyProxy transitions from T-Mode to M-Mode to proactively coun-
teract fingerprinting attacks. In this mode, every incoming payload is delivered
to all associated honeypots. However, merely sending multicast messages would
not work, because each session has unique session variables such as cookie or
shared session key, which are created and managed by the end honeypot. To
address this issue, HoneyProxy builds multiple sockets to maintain a set
of connections between the honeypots and HoneyProxy and records session
data. Section 6.4 elaborates on how HoneyProxy maintains multiple session
data and determines the best reply to send to the attacker among multiple
responses.
• Relay Mode (R-Mode): On the receipt of mode change commands issued
by the HoneyProxy controller, HoneyProxy transitions from M-Mode to
R-Mode or vice versa. R-Mode essentially allows only one connection, which is
established by a high-interaction honeypot, to interact with the attacker while
other sessions are temporarily suspended. Keeping advanced and motivated
attackers connected with low-interaction honeypots is impractical and not fea-
sible. In such case, HoneyProxy is no longer necessarily taking a burden
caused by M-Mode (sending multicast messages to associated honeypots). Due
to these reasons, R-Mode enhances performance by configuring the rest of the
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Table 6.2: Example of Known Fingerprinting Indicators for the SSH Honeypot
Kippo.
Request Response
type payload type payload
exact match uname -a exact match Wed Nov 4 20:45:37 UTC 2009
pattern .{7,}\n exact match bad packet length
exact match vi exact match E558: Terminal entry not found in terminfo
exact match ifconfig exact match HWaddr 00:4c:a8:ab:32:f4
sessions to a standby state. If necessary (e.g., bulk requests that exceed a spec-
ified threshold), the controller can transition to M-Mode to let low-interaction
honeypots interact with attackers again.
6.4.2 Response Selection and Session Management
HoneyProxy maintains known fingerprinting indicators that expose the pres-
ence of honeypots or honeynet architecture. For example, Table 6.2 describes several
known fingerprints from an ssh honeypot named kippo [21, 6]. Depending on the
incoming request, HoneyProxy concludes that fingerprinting attacks are successful
if the response contains predefined indicators by an exact or a pattern match. The
HoneyProxy controller is notified of the event, to keep a record of attackers’ behav-
ior. The proxy module in HoneyProxy discourages sending known fingerprinting
responses to the attacker, therefore it selects another response that does not contain
the fingerprint(s). Because this task is performed during the deep inspection of pack-
ets in flight, the selection decision would not be made by the SDN application but
by the proxy module directly. However, fingerprinting traces are reported back to
the SDN application of HoneyProxy for later usage by the Mode Decision Mod-
ule. Note that, finding fingerprints of honeypots or honeynet architecture shown in
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(N:1 mapping)
LIH 1
LIH 2
HIH
Socket 0
Socket 1
Socket 2
Socket N
{SOCKET 0: {“USER”: “AB”, “PASSWD”: “pwd-ab”, “HOST”: “[proxy_ip]:80”, “SESSION”: “x”}}
{SOCKET 1: {“USER”: “AB”, “PASSWD”: “pwd-ab”, “HOST”: “10.0.0.1:80”, “SESSION”: “x”}}
{SOCKET 2: {“USER”: “AB”, “PASSWD”: “pwd-ab”, “HOST”: “10.0.0.2:80”, “SESSION”: “xx”}}
{SOCKET N: {“USER”: “AB”, “PASSWD”: “pwd-ab”, “HOST”: “[ip]:[port]”, “SESSION”: “xxx”}}
Figure 6.5: An Illustration of Connection Selection and Session Management.
Table 6.2 is out of our research scope.
HoneyProxy manages multiple sessions in a structured fashion. It establishes
a session with an attacker and internally creates a number of sessions (n) with the
associated honeypots. Figure 6.5 illustrates a snapshot of active sockets running in
M-Mode that maintains 1 : N sessions. Socket 0 corresponds to a connection made
by the attacker whereas the rest correspond to each of connection with a vulnerable
service of N honeypots. Each session is centrally managed by the proxy module of
HoneyProxy (Connection Management Engine) including attacker’s identity (e.g.
a pair of username and password). Because each session data may vary, those infor-
mation is stored in the table so that HoneyProxy can rewrite the attacker’s socket,
allowing the vulnerable service to properly accept payloads. Examples of session
information include cookies of a HTTP service and a shared session key of an ssh
service.
6.4.3 Transition Criteria of HoneyProxy Controller
To make a reasonable decision of whether or not the attacker needs to be served
by a high-interaction honeypot (R-Mode), we develop several criteria, which includes
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connection duration (δt), fingerprinting attack counts (#c), and previous record of
an attacker (< Rt, Rc >). The same IP address that has the same identity (username
and password pair) is used to locate the previous records. For those who previously
accessed our honeynet, we keep records of those attackers into Malicious Behavior
Logs repository. HoneyProxy looks up the past records from the repository to
utilize them to better serve the attackers. The mode of operation function (fm) for
the session (s) is determined by the following equation.
fm(s) =


R-Mode, if Rt
Rt+δt
· Rc +
δt
Rt+δt
·#c ≥ θ
M-Mode, otherwise
We configure a threshold value (θ) to balance the workloads of low-interaction hon-
eypots and high-interaction honeypots.
6.5 Flow Programming Mechanism
HoneyProxy takes advantage of the programmability of SDN. The Connection
Management Engine classifies the type of incoming packets and adds tagging informa-
tion to the packets. Using the tags, the SDN controller enforces appropriate actions
to process the packets.
6.5.1 Flow Programming
Inspired by tagging techniques [48, 54], we leverage the MPLS field to classify
incoming traffic and statically reroute the incoming packets based on the marked tag.
The Request Handler first divides incoming traffic into “scanning attacks” (L3 or
below) and others that would be further categorized by the Connection Management
Engine. The Connection Management Engine is responsible to classify the packet
into four types (T =< S, F, T,M,R >) such that S belongs to scanning attacks, F
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belongs to fingerprinting attempts and T,M,R are an element of T-Mode, M-Mode,
and R-Mode, respectively. However, this syntax cannot account for each vulnerable
services across diverse honeypots. We thus specify the destined service information
(S =< s, h, d, f · · · >) for more accurate analysis of malicious traffic where s, h, d, f
stand for the ssh, http, database, and ftp services, respectively. In summary, the total
number of SDN rules to process incoming traffic is therefore computed by |T | × |S|.
This information is recorded and used by the Mode Decision Module of HoneyProxy
to take appropriate actions for attackers.
6.5.2 Blocking Malware Propagation
To block internal propagation of malware within the honeynet, traditional hon-
eynets insert host-based access control rules (e.g., iptables) in each honeypot machine
to prevent potential malicious traffic from being generated. However, once a honey-
pot is compromised, the attacker can circumvent the host-based access control rules.
To address this issue, HoneyProxy uses a network-wide monitoring scheme and
enforces access control rules via the SDN controller instead of enabling host level
protection. To this end, SDN rules are installed in the network to forward outgo-
ing traffic to the specific honeypot that runs the intrusion detection system (IDS),
such as snort. In this way, internal traffic between honeypots is also be monitored
by an IDS, so it consequently helps network administrators detect internal malware
propagation. Note that, the routing path of incoming traffic is not identical to that
of outgoing traffic because the incoming packets would pass through IDS. Also, in-
coming and outgoing flows are physically separated by SDN rules; as all incoming
traffic is tagged by the proxy module of HoneyProxy, which is extremely useful for
network administrators to manage the network and investigate security breaches.
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Table 6.3: RESTful Application Programming Interfaces Between the Reverse Proxy
Module (P) and the SDN Application (S).
Application Programming Interface Direction Type
/api/addhoneypot/[service] S→P POST
/api/gethoneypots S→P GET
/api/runproxy/[service] S→P POST
/api/killproxy/[service] S→P GET
/api/sdn/modechange/[id] S→P POST
/api/sdn/connection/[id] P→S POST
/api/sdn/connection/[id]/fingerprint P→S POST
6.6 Implementation
We implement HoneyProxy with a commonly used SDN controller, POX [27],
along with KVM virtualization infrastructure to run a number of virtual honeypots.
For agile development of HoneyProxy, we choose to use the Python language to
build the proxy module and the corresponding SDN application of HoneyProxy. As
explained in Section 6.3, the Python module has three subcomponents, and it runs a
separate RESTful server to communicate with the SDN application over HTTP. The
supported RESTful application programming interfaces between the proxy module
and corresponding SDN applications are summarized in Table 6.3. To run the proxy
instance, the HoneyProxy SDN application should configure each of the honeypots
using /api/addhoneypot/[service]. Because our proxy module runs at TCP layer
(L4), any services built on top of TCP would work, including http, ftp, and database
services. It additionally supports transport layer security (TLS) to address https
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and ssh services. After configuring honeypots, the SDN application can instantiate
a number of proxies by sending /api/runproxy/[service] request. Each proxy
binds to the specified port and serves one vulnerable service per proxy. To enhance
the overall performance of a proxy, we implement parallel programming techniques
to run multiple worker processes. If a proxy receives fingerprinting indicators, it
notifies the server with relevant data, along with associated connection identifier via
/api/sdn/connection/[id]/fingerprint.
Next, we elaborate the packet processing logic of M-Mode in HoneyProxy 1 .
First, a proxy instance listens on an assigned port. We use the Python select module
to receive payloads from one or more sockets in an asynchronous manner. Upon the
receipt of a new payload via a specific socket, the proxy checks the affiliation of this
socket. If the socket is not found from the existing socket pool, it means that a new
attack has arrived at our honeynet, causing the proxy to create a new socket map
(see Figure 6.5). Otherwise HoneyProxy locates the matching socket map from the
pool. In case the socket is originated from the attacker, HoneyProxy performs deep
packet inspection (DPI) to search for any known fingerprinting attempts (Table 6.2).
It then makes a copy of the payloads and performs network address translation (NAT)
to send multicast messages to all associated honeypots. Consequently, HoneyProxy
creates an empty receiving queue (R Queue) for this socket map where the size of
the queue is set to the number of associated honeypots (N). Returning responses
from honeypots are inserted into the R Queue until it becomes full (i.e., all requests
are returned). On this event (or a timeout is reached), HoneyProxy chooses the
response from the R Queue to send back to the attacker. Section 6.4.2 discusses how
HoneyProxy selects an appropriate response.
1Because algorithms for the rest (T-Mode and R-Mode) are relatively straightforward than that
of M-Mode, we only introduce its detailed logic for brevity.
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YES Select rs from R_Queue
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Perform DPI and NAT,
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to R_Queue
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Create new socket map,
[1:N]
NO
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Figure 6.6: Packet Processing Logic of M-Mode of HoneyProxy.
6.7 Evaluation
Monitoring and analyzing payloads of incoming and outgoing packets requires
a considerable amount of resources. In particular, when the data arrives at the
proxy module of HoneyProxy, it must conduct a pair-wise comparison with known
fingerprinting attacks, thereby it could be a bottleneck for processing the requests.
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Figure 6.7: Testbed Network Configuration.
The fundamental question, hence, is to quantify the overhead of HoneyProxy and
the overhead affect the behaviors of attackers. To this end, we consider three test
metrics while conducting the experiments: (1) throughput (Mbits per second), (2)
latency (milliseconds), and (3) CPS (connections per second). We first introduce our
testbed followed by detailed experimental results.
6.7.1 Test Environment
Figure 6.7 illustrates the testbed setup for the evaluation. Our testbed consists of
two physical machines, each of which has Intel Xeon CPUs (E5-2658v3 @ 2.20GHz,
24-cores) and 128GB RAM. One machine runs HoneyProxy (the proxy module and
HoneyProxy controller) on CentOS 7.2 (Linux kernel v.3.10.0) and the other runs
KVM virtualization infrastructure on Ubuntu 16.04 (Linux kernel v.4.4.0) to emulate
a set of honeypots. To create a network of honeypots, we used a software switch
(OpenvSwitch v.2.5.0 [25]) that can act as an SDN switch. All incoming traffic des-
tined to our SDN-based honeynet is considered malicious and, therefore, would pass
through HoneyProxy. As shown in Figure 6.7, HoneyProxy interconnects the
external network (Internet) and honeynet by relaying the packets from the Internet
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Running Modes.
to honeynet or vice versa.
To effectively run the experiments, our testbed was configured to run two repre-
sentative services: http and ssh. For the http service, we chose a widely deployed
low-interaction honeypot, glostopf [12], and HIHAT [14], a high-interaction honey-
pot. To run the ssh service, kippo [21] was selected as a low-interaction honeypot
and HonSSH plays a role of high-interaction honeypot. Each honeypot is configured
to have 4 vCPUs along with 4GB RAM, and the link speed for every honeypot was
set to maximum 1 Gbps.
6.7.2 Performance of HoneyProxy
As explained in Section 6.6, HoneyProxy utilizes parallel programming tech-
niques to effectively utilize multicore CPUs for scalability. Figure 6.8 shows TCP
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throughput results with respect to different number of worker processes used in Hon-
eyProxy. To measure the test metric, we used iperf [1]. When a single worker pro-
cess was used, T-Mode achieved 264 Mbits per second (Mbps). M-Mode and R-Mode
showed 83 and 157 Mbps, respectively. It is worthwhile to note that M-Mode creates
a copy of malicious payloads and sends multicast messages, therefore it requires a
considerable amount of resources compared to the others. Overall TCP throughput
performance linearly increased with respect to increasing number of worker processes.
For example, when eight worker processes were employed, T-Mode scaled up to the
near line rate speed (942 Mbps), and we observed that the other modes also showed
proportionally increased results (M-Mode 471 Mbps and T-Mode 729 Mbps, respec-
tively).
Although we have obtained the near line rate TCP throughput in T-Mode, we
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could still enhance the performance of other modes. To this end, we re-implemented
the proxy module using C language to investigate how much performance we could
achieve. As a result, C-version of HoneyProxy was able to hit the line rate TCP
throughput using only one worker process regardless of the selection of modes: 941
Mbps for T-Mode, 940 Mbps for M-Mode, and 934 Mbps for R-Mode, respectively.
We took latency as an additional test metric to measure the performance, because
latency can show end-to-end responsiveness between attackers and honeypots while
throughput metric measures the performance with respect to a massive data trans-
action. To conduct these experiments, we implemented a socket server and client to
measure the latency. The client sends a hello message to the server, and the server
responds back with an echo message. We measure the round trip time (RTT ) for
the client to send and receive the message. To obtain ground truth, we first ran the
custom server on one of the honeypots and measured the latency without running
HoneyProxy. As illustrated in Figure 6.9, RTT took 0.5 milliseconds on average.
When HoneyProxy was enabled, the average RTT was observed in the range of 1
and 1.7 milliseconds. Each mode showed 1.24, 1.50, and 1.32 on average, respectively
(ordered by T-Mode, M-Mode, and R-Mode). From these results, we could expect
0.5 1.2 milliseconds delay incurred by HoneyProxy. These results are shown in
Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 shows latency variations based on differing the number of worker pro-
cesses and the location of attackers. We repeated the same experiment to measure
the latency metric with respect to different number of worker processes. We then
conducted the identical experiments over internet to measure how much latency can
be attributed to different geolocational network access. Note that the experiments,
which were conducted within the same network (the third column), were mainly used
to provide the ground information for the latter experiments (the fourth column).
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Table 6.4: Latency Variations Based on Different Number of Worker Processes and
Network Access Points.
Proxy Mode
Number of
Workers
Access within
The Network
Access Over
The Internet
T-Mode
1 1.24 165.13
2 1.14 195.71
4 0.94 168.45
M-Mode
1 1.50 167.81
2 1.19 167.08
4 1.15 168.84
R-Mode
1 1.32 166.79
2 1.15 167.15
4 1.05 168.14
As expected, the more worker processes were used, the less RTT was observed, re-
gardless of the type of modes. However, if the client (attackers) accessed from the
external network (e.g., over internet), RTTs were not distinguishable. In this case,
consistent duration time were measured at approximately 166 milliseconds. The time
delta between different number of workers observed in the first experiments (within
the network) were less than .35 milliseconds, and this pattern was no longer effective
due to unforeseeable delays in the internet. In particular, several outliers observed in
T-Mode with two worker processes made the average of RTT considerably high. Our
experimental results demonstrate that it would be difficult for attackers to identify
the operating mode of HoneyProxy remotely.
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6.8 Related Work
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a promising future network technology.
When we discuss about applications for security, we look for qualities such as pro-
grammability, flexibility, agility, and scalability to easily define and enforce security
policies [4, 107]. SDN has the potential to address these requirements of security
by providing a global view and centralized control mechanisms to SDN applications.
By the same token, SDN can help provide flexibility in monitoring and controlling
untrusted traffic within honeynet. We thus leverage the SDN approach in our imple-
mentation to centrally monitor and route packets to honeypots, thereby supporting
internal traffic monitoring and mitigate the risk of internal malware propagation.
Honeypot farm [17] is an approach which involves deployment of many virtual
honeypots in a network. Any malicious traffic directed to the real network will be
sent to the dedicated group og honeypots in the network without the knowledge of the
attacker. However, this approach only redirects the malicious traffic to the honeypot
farm, does not provide any data control mechanisms, and it is also vulnerable to
internal propagation of malware. Our prototype makes use of SDN technology, which
separates out the control plane to a different entity altogether from the data plane so
as to have centralized control over the entire network.
Honeybrid [15] is an architecture which is closely related to our approach which
uses connection migration between low-interaction and high-interaction honeypots to
take advantage of the functionalities provided by both types of honeypots. However,
honeybrid has a few design flaws. In their mechanism, only the first scanning attacks
are handled by low-interaction honeypot, and the rest of connection are relayed to a
high-interaction honeypot. Therefore,the high-interaction honeypots are active dur-
ing majority of the connection time. On the other hand, HoneyProxy, based on
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its analysis of the incoming payloads, will route traffic dynamically to be handled by
either low-interaction or high-interaction honeypot at any given time.
Collapsar [71] enables a VM-based honeyfarm architecture, which consists of a
group of virtual honeypots. It aims at providing centralized administration, effi-
cient data classification, and distributed view of honeypots. Though this architecture
succeeds in providing centralized monitoring of the honeypots, it does not support
connection migration between low-interaction and high-interaction honeypots, which
becomes important when dealing with a large scale of various attacks to the system.
Our work, HoneyProxy, is greatly influenced by HoneyMix[62], which presents
a native SDN-based honeynet architecture. HoneyMix[62] involves deployment of
various modules in the SDN controller for dynamic connection selection. However, it
does not discuss design issues, implementation, or evaluation details.
6.9 Discussion and Limitations
As most of the internet traffic contains either web traffic (http) or file requests
which are carried out using ssh, HoneyProxy aims at detecting attacks that are
mainly centered around these protocols, such as fingerprinting attacks, login attempts,
and denial of service. Hence, we mainly focused on http and ssh services in mind.
However, there may exist a special purpose honeypot that is targeting a very specific
service. For example, conpot [9] emulates the industrial control system (ICS), which
is also known as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. Due
to its unique feature, having this honeypot within HoneyProxy architecture does
not actually provide an extra benefit over existing honeynet architecture. This is
because HoneyProxy basically assumes that multiple honeypots are serving the
same service (redundancy of services).
Our implementation only takes advantage of existing honeypots to provide higher
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quality of data capture and data control, thereby acting as a mediator that lures the
attacker and provides a hoax system which emulates the real network characteristics
by taking into account diverse functionality present in various existing honeypots.
It does not fix the defects and vulnerabilities in individual honeypots [5, 71]. The
level of security would depend on the capabilities of honeypots that are present in the
honeynet. Our assumption is that by having foolproof honeypots, we could take ad-
vantage of the uniqueness of each of them by connecting them to an entity which could
centrally monitor and respond to the attacker behind a honeywall. Thus reducing the
chances of revelation of the honeynets and hence provide network administrators suf-
ficient information that would help in detection, prevention and securing the network
infrastructure.
HoneyProxy fundamentally relies on intrusion detection systems (IDS) for de-
tecting internal malware propagation by configuring way point of internal traffic. It
means that an advanced malware might not be filtered by our approach, depend-
ing on the capability of IDS. Another technique that can address this limitation is
VMI-based abnormality detection [82]. By monitoring the state of virtual machines
via hypervisors, we can detect suspicious virtual machines at first hand. However,
VMI-based solutions are valid if and only if honeypots are implemented in a virtu-
alized environment whereas HoneyProxy generally works regardless of the type of
residing honeypots.
Due to an exponential increase in attacks on the internet system each day, it is
very important to build powerful data capture and data control tools and techniques
to efficiently provide early warning and detection of threats so that effective security
mechanisms can be installed on the network systems. Instead of focusing on securing
various ssh and web transactions, many researchers have shifted their study toward
expanding applicable area such as Smart Grid, IoT, etc. Honeypots and honeynets
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are great technologies that can be exploited by the security community. Implementing
a competent honeynet system has the potential of being a catalyst to a more secure
internet system. This comes with a lot of unknowns and challenges. We hope this
chapter triggers active discussion in honeynet researches and security professionals
would work toward inventing new techniques to outplay the attackers [50].
6.10 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have articulated the limitations of existing honeypots and hon-
eynet architecture: (1) fingerprinting attacks, (2) internal malware propagation, and
(3) honeypots transition. To overcome these shortcomings, we presented an inno-
vated SDN-based honeynet architecture called HoneyProxy as a next generation
honeynet. In HoneyProxy, honeypots were grouped by vulnerable services to re-
shape the landscape of honeynet architecture toward one ‘BIG’ honeypot. To this
end, we have designed HoneyProxy that consists of the reverse proxy module and
corresponding SDN application. We devised a novel Connection Management Engine
as a part of the proxy to select the response that does not have fingerprinting indi-
cators and enable dynamic transitions between low-interaction and high-interaction
honeypots. To address internal malware propagation, we introduced a flow pro-
gramming scheme supported by the SDN application of HoneyProxy. We have
implemented HoneyProxy using python and C programming languages.Our exper-
imental results have demonstrated that HoneyProxy was able to support the near
line rate throughput (942 Mbps) using parallel programming techniques, and latency
incurred HoneyProxy was negligible (0.5− 1.2 milliseconds).
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we have proposed a systematic policy management framework
for SDN to address several security challenges. To address complex relations across
multiple SDN applications, we remove those dependency relations by applying grid-
based policy decomposition mechanism. To prevent indirect security violations, we
have built automated policy conflicts detection/resolution mechanisms, which are
based on analysis of stateless network rules. To remedy statelessness property of
existing OpenFlow, we then come up with an innovative stateful monitoring scheme
by extending current OpenFlow specifications. To facilitate the wide adoption of
SDN and test its capability for improving security of networks, we also proposed an
SDN-based next generation honeynet architecture that enables policy-driven network
defense mechanisms.
7.1 Dissertation Contributions
This dissertation makes following contributions:
• We proposed a systematic policy management framework for managing policies
for SDN that enables policy-driven network defense mechanisms. The frame-
work includes several mechanisms: reliable network rule generation mechanism,
stateless policy violation detection/resolution mechanism, and stateful network
monitoring scheme.
• We proposed the grid-based policy decomposition mechanism to generate reli-
able network rules by eliminating dependency relations in an SDN application
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and/or across multiple applications. Our decomposition mechanism computes
and eliminates intra-app and inter-app dependencies, and enables a secure and
efficient network rule generation.
• We proposed FlowGuard that facilitates not only accurate violation detec-
tion but also systematic resolution mechanisms based on the analysis of stateless
network rules in OpenFlow-based networks. The violation detection approach
in FlowGuard detects the indirect security violations by examining flow path
space against firewall authorization space, and it is capable of tracking flow
paths in the entire network and checking rule dependencies in both flow ta-
bles [74] and firewall policies [122]. In addition, we introduced a flexible and
effective violation resolution mechanism with the help of four resolution strate-
gies, namely dependency breaking, update rejecting, flow removing, and packet
blocking.
• We proposed a stateful network monitoring framework called StateMon that
helps SDN support state-aware security applications by maintaining global con-
nection states and providing common APIs to them. To this end, we also
proposed the OpenConnection protocol, which is a lightweight extension to
OpenFlow, and it retains the simple “match-action” programmable feature of
OpenFlow to enable a stateful SDN data plane.
• To facilitate the wide adoption of SDN and test its capability for improving
security of networks, we have proposed an SDN-based next generation hon-
eynet architecture called HoneyProxy. HoneyProxy consists of the reverse
proxy module and corresponding SDN application. We devised a novel Con-
nection Management Engine as a part of the proxy to select the response that
does not have fingerprinting indicators and enable dynamic transitions between
144
low-interaction and high-interaction honeypots. To address internal malware
propagation, we introduced a flow programming scheme supported by the SDN
application of HoneyProxy.
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